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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this dissertation is to empirically analyze the results of the retail location 
decision making process and how chain networks evolve given their value platform. It 
employs one of the largest cross-sectional databases of retailers ever assembled, 
including 50 US retail chains and over 70,000 store locations. Three closely related 
articles, which develop new theory explaining location deployment and behaviors of 
retailers, are presented. The first article, “Regionalism in US Retailing,” presents a 
comprehensive spatial analysis of the domestic patterns of retailers. Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) and statistics examine the degree to which the chains are 
deployed regionally versus nationally. Regional bias is found to be associated with store 
counts, small market deployment, and the location of the founding store, but not the age 
of the chain. Chains that started in smaller markets deploy more stores in other small 
markets and vice versa for chains that started in larger markets. The second article, “The 
Location Types of US Retailers,” is an inductive analysis of the types of locations chosen 
by the retailers. Retail locations are classified into types using cluster analysis on 
situational and trade area data at the geographical scale of the individual stores. A total of 
twelve distinct location types were identified. A second cluster analysis groups together 
the chains with the most similar location profiles. Retailers within the same retail 
business often chose similar types of locations and were placed in the same clusters. 
Retailers generally restrict their deployment to one of three overall strategies including 
metropolitan, large retail areas, or market size variety. The third article, “Modeling Retail 
Chain Expansion and Maturity through Wave Analysis: Theory and Application to 
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Walmart and Target,” presents a theory of retail chain expansion and maturity whereby 
retailers expand in waves with alternating periods of faster and slower growth. Walmart 
diffused gradually from Arkansas and Target grew from the coasts inward. They were 
similar, however, in that after expanding into an area they reached a point of saturation 
and opened fewer stores, then moved on to other areas, only to revisit the earlier areas for 
new stores. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The objective of retailing in a capitalistic economic system is to supply items that 
consumers demand, with profit maximization being part and parcel. Retailing is a 
complex business, however, especially given its dynamic structure. As consumer needs 
and preferences evolve, they have become increasingly differentiated. For example, 
differences in income, family or household structure, employment, age, areas of in- or 
out-migration, proximity to recreational activities, and more affect consumer demand and 
the preference for store types (Vias 2004; Carpenter and Moore 2006; Gonzalez-Benito et 
al. 2007). Also, the evolution of markets, technology, and the overall economy affect 
where and how people shop. In addition, many retailers are publically traded companies, 
and stock prices generally rise when retailers are opening new stores (Serpkenci and 
Tigert 2006). 
Given the pressure to grow, and the increasing differentiation among consumers, the 
retail marketplace experienced a proliferation of different types of chain stores selling 
different types of merchandise diffusing over space. Each retailer has a unique value 
platform (see Table 1.1 for definition of this and other key terms). The value platform 
encapsulates all aspects of the consumer experience with the retailer. In the early 
twentieth century, department stores were abundant, and many were in central business 
districts (CBDs), accessible to mass transportation systems (Padilla and Eastlick 2009). 
The advent of the automobile and population shifts to lower density neighborhoods led to 
retailers moving from the CBDs to suburban shopping centers and malls in the 1960s 
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(Craig et al. 1984). Discount department stores like Target and Walmart spread across the 
US during the 1970s and 1980s (Joseph 2010). These two chains provide an example of 
competitors with different value platforms (Walmart with its everyday low prices vs. 
Target as an upscale discounter). In the 1990s, category killers became a dominant 
participant in the retail landscape, often choosing to locate with other category killers and 
a larger anchor tenant in power centers. Their growth is attributed to price advantages due 
to the economies of scale and relationships with vendors, as well as offering a better 
customer experience because of merchandise mix, ease of parking, service, and the 
opportunity for multi-purpose shopping in power centers, as well as other factors 
(Hernandez et al. 2004). Other formats were also quickly developing from small niche 
retailers to large warehouse chains like Costco. In the 2000s, e-commerce became 
increasingly competitive with traditional brick and mortar stores (Brynjolfsson et al. 
2009). Although the previous discussion only highlights a few relevant but influential 
changes to the structure of retailing, the types and locations of contemporary retail stores 
are a result of this evolution.  
With each new store, a retailer had to support the decision on why it was in its best 
interest to deploy at a particular site at a particular moment in time. Most retailers open 
new stores to grow or protect sales or market share. Ideally, the decision maker that is 
accountable for real estate deployment within the retail organization approves locations 
that are consistent with its value platform. For example, chains like Toys “R” Us may 
target areas near households with discretionary income and the presence of children. 
Depending on the value platform, there are a discrete amount of potential locations for 
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deployment that can support the sales thresholds of the stores. Rational behavior suggests 
that a retailer that desires to grow, and is in a financial position to do so, will continue to 
open new stores in sites that best fit its value platform if they can generate an acceptable 
level of profitability. Over the life of the business, these individual decisions form a chain 
network, or a distribution of stores over space. Geographers are renowned for studying 
distributions of market centers and retail stores, with considerations given to size and 
type of products offered. Depending on the type of retailer involved, the opportunities for 
growing the business through new store deployment may be affected by the general laws 
of retail geography, such as establishing a limit on how many stores of a certain type can 
be situated in a region, or whether a trade area can support the deployment of a particular 
type of store. 
 
Table 1.1. Retail Terms  
Term Meaning 
Category Killer A specialist that offers a focused line of merchandise but with a vast assortment and 
generally low prices, thus differentiating itself from the competition and making it 
challenging for the presence of multiple competitors in the marketplace (e.g. Best Buy). 
Power Center Three or more big-box retailers with shared parking lot and typically ancillary smaller 
commercial services (Hernandez et al. 2004). 
General 
Merchandiser 
A retailer that does not offer a focused line with few complementary products but instead 
offers a variety of product lines. 
Big-Box Store A very large retail store, say over 10,000 square feet, such as a general merchandise 
retailer like Walmart or a specialist such as PetSmart. 
Note: category killer and general merchandiser are mutually exclusive categories, but 
either can also be a big-box store. 
Intratype 
Competitor 
Competition between the same type of retailer selling similar products, say those with the 
same SIC code (e.g. between Petco and PetSmart). 
Intercategory 
Competitor 
Competition between specialists (category killers) and general mass merchandisers (e.g 
between PetSmart and Walmart). 
Omni-Channel A type of retailing that provides a seamless approach to the consumer experience through 
all various shopping channels (e.g. brick and mortar, e-commerce, mobile, etc.) 
Value Platform The entire shopping experience that a consumer receives from the purchase and 
consumption of a good or service according to Thrall (2002). Includes items such as 
situation of store location, personnel, service, display of goods, etc. 
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1.2 Classical Retail Geography 
The retail geography literature is rich in tradition. Influential contributions in the 
twentieth century helped shape theories concerning the spatial relationships between 
markets, stores, competitors, and customers. Much of this research can be ultimately be 
tracked back to Reilly (1931) and Huff (1963, 1964) with their efforts to develop 
methods for delineating trade areas using spatial interaction models, and to Christaller 
(1933), Lösch (1954), Berry and Garrison (1958), and Berry (1963) for the development 
and advancement of central place theory and the classification of markets. Applebaum 
(1966) demonstrated applied methods for determining trade areas and forecasting sales at 
particular sites. Location-allocation models were applied to identify optimal site locations 
for multi-store deployment (Goodchild 1984). Berry identified hierarchies of retail 
centers. Reilly and Huff demonstrated how markets or retail space of greater size could 
attract sales from greater distances. Retailers could also sell higher-order goods in these 
larger cities and retail centers because there is the necessary threshold of population 
needed to offer such items, which is also supported by central place theory. 
Christaller (1933) developed central place theory, which is a spatially organized 
hierarchical system of market centers based on the marketing principle where the 
maximum amount of demand is supplied by a minimum number of central places. The 
friction of distance determines the range, which is the maximum distance consumers are 
willing to travel for a good. In order for the producer to make a profit, the threshold (the 
minimum level of demand needed for the producer to be profitable) must be smaller than 
the range. With demand evenly spread out over an isotropic plane, a uniform lattice of 
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market centers serves identical non-overlapping hexagonal areas equal to threshold size. 
There is continuum of goods and services ranging from low order with a small threshold 
and small range (e.g. groceries) to high order with a large threshold and large range (e.g. 
furniture). There are more market centers with lower order goods than higher order, 
although goods of different orders may cluster in the same central place because higher 
order centers include all lesser order goods.  
Lösch (1954) followed with a different version of central place theory that allowed 
for specialization of market centers. Unlike the rigid hierarchy of Christaller, centers of 
the same size could now produce quite different combinations of goods. With the 
assumption that firms are free to enter the market and maximize profit, equilibrium is 
established as new firms continue to enter the market to capture excess profits until the 
entry of a new firm causes all firms to experience a loss. In Lösch’s version, the total 
distance between production points is minimized in order to maximize consumer welfare. 
The maximum amount of purchases can be made locally because the largest number of 
production locations coincide, which follows the principle of least effort. Berry and 
Garrison (1958) found that larger cities were more likely to get closer to equilibrium than 
smaller cities. 
Retail gravity models, developed by Reilly (1931) and Huff (1963, 1964), include 
many of the same components as central place theory. In attempting to identify the 
breaking points between the retail pull of two differently sized cities, Reilly (1931) found 
that as the population of a city increased, trade from outside the city increased at about a 
similar rate. He also identified a distance-decay parameter of around two, meaning that 
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trade decreased at a rate nearly twice as fast as distance increased. According to Huff 
(1963, 1964), customers were willing to travel much farther for higher-order goods. The 
Huff Model allows for customizing the distance-decay parameter, in which the analyst 
can consider the different types of trading and retail areas and products. For example, 
Young (1975) found that large regional shopping centers attracted customers from nearly 
twice the drive time as smaller neighborhood shopping centers in Philadelphia. Drezner 
and Drezner (2002) found that distance-decay lowers as the time spent shopping 
increases. For further reading, Cooper and Nakanishi (1988) provide a good review of 
parameter calibration techniques for gravity models. 
There are has been considerable research that has focused on the spatial organization 
of retailers and competitors. Hotelling (1929) inspired the research on spatial and pricing 
competition. There have been studies suggesting that competitors intentionally cluster 
together in space (Brown 1989; Miller et al. 1999; Oppewal and Holyoake 2004). 
Agglomeration–the bundling of retail activities–extends the size of trade areas because of 
the opportunities for multipurpose and comparison shopping (Cox 1959; O’Kelly 1981; 
Ghosh and McLafferty 1987; Berman and Evans 1998; Mittelstaedt and Stassen 1990; 
Oppewal and Holyoake 2004; Reimers and Clulow 2004; Leszczyc et al. 2004). Stores 
selling similar types of merchandise may cluster together because it reduces consumer 
search (Ghosh 1986; West 1992). Customers are more likely to find desired products and 
services as well (Brown 1989). From the macro-scale perspective, many chains diffuse 
methodically through space and time (Jones 1981). Regional concentration has been 
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connected to the distances from chain headquarters or distribution centers (Doyle and 
Cook 1980; Laulajainen 1987; Graff 1998; Zhu and Singh 2009). 
 
1.3 Research Agenda 
The classical studies have been the inspiration for the continued advancement and 
sophistication of methods that still incorporate the basic principles of these early models. 
Given all of the changes to the structure of retailing, however, additional coverage is 
needed concerning how the evolution of the decision making process by retailers is 
affected by retail type. Furthermore, the retail landscape has experienced dramatic growth 
and diffusion of chain stores. From 1983 to 1993, retail space per capita almost tripled in 
the United States (Sternquist 1997). With only a limited number of locations that can be 
profitable for a particular type of store, an expanding retailer has only a certain amount of 
opportunities for organic growth until it can no longer sustain the addition of new stores 
in a familiar way without cannibalizing its existing stores. This dissertation refers to this 
stage of a retailer’s evolution as real-estate maturity. The US has been over-stored for a 
long time leading to growth in international markets and the development of new concept 
stores. There is a dearth of research that accounts for how retailers affect the level of real-
estate maturity in regards to their value platform and business practices. The literature is 
also underdeveloped concerning how retail strategies and spatial competition are affected 
by real-estate maturity. Given that the structure of the chain network and the level of 
maturity are the manifestation of all those individual decisions, retailers need to be 
studied more specifically along the lines of internal and external factors that affect overall 
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deployment strategies and the associated levels of consistency of locations chosen. To 
that end, three distinct articles are presented to address decision making in this changing 
retail landscape. In fact, these articles comprise a mega-analysis of US domestic retail 
locations of the largest chains to identify any systematic patterns of major retailers as 
they move beyond the stage of maturity including analyzing them among types of 
retailers and value platforms, and competitors at various scales including the national 
level, trade-area level, and deployment over time, as well as the size of markets and retail 
areas. 
In addition to addressing three related aspects of the overall research question of how 
do major chain store retailers arrange their stores in the US, the three articles leverage 
one of the largest cross-sectional databases of retailers ever assembled, including 50 US 
retail chains and over 70,000 store locations, obtained in 2009. The first article, 
“Regionalism in US Retailing,” presents a comprehensive spatial analysis of the domestic 
patterns of major US retail chains. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and statistics 
examine the degree to which 50 of the largest chains are deployed regionally versus 
nationally. We investigate whether factors such as the age of the chain, store count, or the 
size of the markets in which stores are located (or founded) are related to the level of 
regional concentration.  
In the second article, “The Location Types of US Retailers,” we present the results of 
an inductive analysis of the types of locations chosen by US retailers. We empirically 
develop a classification of retail location types using cluster analysis on situational and 
trade area data at the geographical scale of the individual stores. These data are then 
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applied to each of the studied chains to create a domestic location profile for each retailer. 
Based on the results of the first cluster analysis, a second cluster analysis then groups 
together the chains with the most similar location profiles. We also test whether value 
platform or category of retailer is related to the type of market or retail area most 
common for deployment. 
In the final article, “Modeling Retail Chain Expansion and Maturity through Wave 
Analysis: Theory and Application to Walmart and Target,” we study retail store 
deployment through the analysis of waves. Based on concepts originally developed in 
coastal geomorphology and adapted to medical geography, we present a theory of retail 
chain expansion and maturity whereby retailers expand in waves with alternating periods 
of faster and slower growth.  
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2. Regionalism in US Retailing 
2.1. Introduction 
Retailing trends are dynamic: many well-known US retailers such as Office Max and 
PetSmart did not exist 30 years ago, and Walmart, the largest retailer in the world, with 
sales exceeding those of the next five largest US retailers (Fortune 2008), was merely a 
regional chain at that time. Now there is a Walmart store within five miles of more than 
half of all Americans and over two thirds of all other retail stores (Basker 2007). 
Numerous studies have looked at the spatial patterns and diffusion processes of major 
retailers, but these studies have mostly been limited to a small number of particular 
chains and competitors (Graff 1998; Karande and Lombard 2005; Jia 2008; Joseph 2010). 
However, with so many national retailers vying for customers by deploying networks of 
stores numbering from the low hundreds to nearly 10,000, there is a need for a more 
comprehensive spatial analysis of the deployment of major US retail chains.  
For retailers, especially publicly traded companies, continual growth is paramount. 
Retail companies cannot always deploy stores in their historical regions if they want to 
continue growing (Jones 1981). If they do continue to expand in familiar markets, 
however, new stores may cannibalize the trade areas of existing stores within the chain as 
markets become oversaturated. The result of this trend is that many large retailers have a 
network of stores in a number of different markets. Joseph (2010) suggested that a retail 
company reaches domestic real-estate maturity when it can no longer open new stores in 
traditional or desired markets without significant cannibalization of existing stores. 
Following this line of thinking, the level of regional concentration of a retail chain may 
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be related to its stage in the real-estate maturity process. 
This article uses Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and statistics to examine the 
degree to which 50 of the largest US domestic retail chains are deployed regionally 
versus nationally. Metrics such as spatial mean center, standard distance, and standard 
distance ellipse are employed to analyze the locations of these chains. Regional 
concentration is also evaluated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), measuring 
the concentration of stores across major US regions. We investigate whether factors such 
as the age of the chain, store count, or the size of the markets in which stores (or the first 
store) are located are correlated with the level of regional concentration as indicated by 
the chain’s standard distance and HHI values. Retail types are discussed both collectively 
and individually as the processes may vary depending on type of retailer and the 
associated locational requirements. 
 
2.2. Relevant Literature 
This study builds on research that has focused on the process of retail contagion, or 
diffusion of retail stores over space. Much of this literature attempted to identify the 
underlying processes behind how and why retail chain networks evolve. The locations of 
retail stores have been explained by factors including the distances from chain 
headquarters or distribution centers. Regional concentration near such locations can be 
advantageous because of economies of scale, lower distribution costs, and higher 
customer awareness (Doyle and Cook 1980; Graff 1998). Expansion may be constrained 
by warehouse locations (Laulajainen 1987). Further, companies that start in smaller 
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towns may hesitate to open stores in large markets and vice versa (Jones and Simmons 
1987). Another important growth strategy for retailers is the acquisition of other chain 
store retailers, which may lead to having locations in a variety of markets (Laulajainen 
1987). Still, many chains diffuse methodically through space and time (Jones 1981).  
A number of studies have focused on particular retailers or groups of competitors. 
Zhu and Singh (2009) found that headquarters location was a determinant of Walmart, 
Target, and Kmart store locations. Walmart did not initially saturate markets because 
most of its early stores were located in isolated smaller towns in the Southeast. Walmart 
eventually expanded to urban markets, although the locations were not far removed from 
distribution centers, and supercenters were clustered near food distribution centers (Graff 
1998). Jia (2008) noted that Walmart was much more likely to open new stores near 
distribution centers than Kmart. Notwithstanding, Graff (2006) observed a concentration 
of standard and Super Kmart stores near their old headquarters in Michigan. Shields and 
Kures (2007) also identified distance to distribution centers as a factor determining which 
stores Kmart closed. Target has focused its store deployment in particular larger markets 
with its standard and supercenter formats (Graff 2006). Joseph (2010) found that 
although Target and Walmart now have the most similar patterns of any time in their 
history (dating back to 1962), they had quite dissimilar expansion strategies, with open 
date and distance to first store being strongly correlated for Walmart but not Target. 
Much of Target’s early growth was the result of acquiring properties from other chains 
such as Fedmart and Gemco, especially in the Western US. As Walmart saturated 
markets farther from its Arkansas headquarters, eventually it revisited markets closer to 
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home for domestic new store expansion, thus reaching a point of domestic real-estate 
maturity (Joseph 2010).  
In summation, various theories have been postulated for how retail chains grow. Most 
studies have noted methodical diffusion processes due to factors such as distance to 
headquarters or distribution centers. However, not all chains follow these patterns and 
that may be related to retail type or chain heritage. Taking a static snapshot of a dynamic 
process, the data and methods for this article are unique in terms of the broad scope of the 
study and the combination of the studied variables. 
 
2.3. Data and Methods 
2.3.1 Data 
This article is based on all the stores in the contiguous lower 48 US states of 50 leading 
domestic retailers. This includes discount department stores such as Walmart and Target, 
“category killers” such as Office Max or Best Buy, as well as other retail types such as 
rental stores. The retailers are grouped according to type of retailer, based on the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Although there are variations in 
specific merchandise mix between retailers within a type, there are enough similarities 
that they can be considered as competitors. The general criteria for inclusion in this study 
were based on three factors: 1) rank of sales according to the 2008 Fortune 1000 list; 2) 
average store size of at least 2,500 square feet; and 3) at least 100 store locations. We 
omit smaller stores that do not involve the same level of risk as larger stores. We also 
excluded grocery stores because the regional chains greatly outnumber the nationally 
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deployed chains. Only a few of the chains had franchises (i.e. Aarons, Pet Supplies Plus, 
Rent-A-Center), while the vast majority had company-owned stores. 
The 70,796 stores of these 50 retailers range in size from 2,500 to over 150,000 
square feet, with as few as 111 locations for Nordstrom to a high of 8,577 for Dollar 
General. We limited the study to the standard, and in some cases supercenter, formats of 
the chains. The locational data were obtained from company websites and Environmental 
Systems Research Institute (ESRI), geocoded, and checked against store locator results 
for at least ten markets for each retailer. 
 
2.3.2 Methods 
The objective is to measure the level of regional clustering of 50 large US retailers and 
identify the factors associated with the clustering in order to understand the systematic 
processes behind retail contagion and future proliferation of retail stores in the US. First, 
we investigate whether chains that start in small markets tend to continue to locate more 
often in other smaller markets. A chain that seeks small market locations would, in 
theory, be able to maintain a high level of regional clustering because there may be 
opportunities for expansion in a larger number of markets. These chains could 
accumulate thousands of stores in desired locations before reaching a point of domestic 
real-estate maturity. Conversely, chains with stores only in larger markets may run out of 
options near the historical region sooner and need to turn to large markets in other parts 
of the country for expansion, even after just opening a few hundred stores. 
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The first store location of each retailer is assigned to one of four categories based on 
2010 market size, according to the US Census (Table 2.1). Each store location is also 
assigned to one of five categories. (There is an additional division of store location 
markets because the number of store locations being studied far outnumbers the amount 
of studied chains.) Non-metro refers to locations that were not classified as metropolitan 
or micropolitan by the US Census Bureau. Cross-tabulating the two creates a 4x5 
contingency table tested with the chi-square statistic. 
 
Table 2.1. Store Count by Market Type and First Store Market 
 
FIRST STORE MARKET STORE LOCATION MARKET 
Metropolitan 7 million + Metropolitan 7 million + 
Metropolitan 1-7 million Metropolitan 1-7 million 
Metropolitan <1 million Metropolitan <1 million 
Micropolitan or Non-metro Micropolitan 50,000-200,000 
 Micropolitan <50,000 or Non-metro 
 
 
The second step is to empirically analyze the patterns of studied retailers using spatial 
statistics for different types of retailers according to the NAICS. This includes identifying 
the spatial mean center (SMC) of each retailer, which is calculated as the mean of the 
eastings (longitude) and northings (latitude) (Lee and Wong 2000). A SMC is calculated 
and plotted for each retailer and compared with the SMCs for the national population, 
national income, and a point file of over 7,000 shopping centers, which was obtained 
from ESRI for the lower 48 states. The population and income SMCs were based on the 
centroids of 2010 US counties. 
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To analyze the degree to which stores are clustered or dispersed around the mean 
center, we calculate the standard distance (SD) in miles for each retail chain and for the 
7,000+ shopping centers. In spatial statistics, standard distance is the equivalent of 
standard deviation (Lee and Wong 2000). Retailers with greater regional clustering will 
generally have lower SD values. To supplement the discussion, we also generate the 
standard distance ellipse (SDE) for the chains to capture any directional bias of the retail 
store locations. The components of a SDE are the angle of rotation, and the deviation 
along the major and minor axes (Lee and Wong 2000; Myint 2008). 
The level of regional clustering is also evaluated by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), which has been frequently used to study the number of firms in an industry. It 
calculated as:  
 
         



N
i
isHHI
1
2
 
                                   (1)  
 
where S is the percentage share of a retailer’s lower 48 stores in region i. A HHI value of 
25 percent indicates an equal distribution of stores across all regions (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1. Map of US Census Regions 
 
The final step is to identify the factors that affect regional concentration. With two 
measures of regional concentration as dependent variables, HHI and SD, we hypothesize 
that retailers with greater regional concentration may be related to factors including age 
of the chain, store count of the chain (in studied area), distribution of stores in smaller 
markets, or the market size of the first store. We test these hypotheses using ordinary 
least-squares (OLS) regression (Table 2.2). The expected signs for HHI and SD are 
inverse of each other because high values of HHI and low values of SD indicated 
regional concentration. We check for multicollinearity using Pearson correlation 
coefficients. The following discussion of hypotheses and rationales focuses on SD as the 
dependent variable, with the opposite applying to the HHI model. 
We expect that chains with a higher share of stores in smaller markets have smaller 
standard distances. This is based on the assumption that retailers are more likely to 
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saturate a region with stores if they are open to deployment opportunities in a variety of 
market sizes, including small markets, which are of course far more numerous. Given the 
familiarity of a region, and the costs of warehousing (logistics) and advertising, it would 
seem more likely that chains would methodically diffuse over space by giving preference 
to new locations that are closer to the home base, as long as additional opportunities 
continue to be available. This process may also be related to whether the chain originated 
in a large or small market, as previously discussed. The other independent variables, 
including the age of the chain (years since founding) and total number of stores in the 
chain, are hypothesized to lead to higher standard distances. Older chains have had more 
time and possibly more pressure to grow their networks through expansion. Chains with 
more store locations may have reached a point of saturation in their traditional markets 
and thus had to explore new markets for store deployment, which would have increased 
the standard distance.  
 
Table 2.2. Regression Variables and Hypotheses 
 
 Independent Variable  Shorthand 
Hypothesis 
(HHI Model) 
Hypothesis 
(SD Model) 
Years since founded AGE - + 
Store count in studied area STORES - + 
Percent of stores not in metropolitan areas SMALL + - 
Population of  first store market POP_FIRST - + 
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2.4. Results and Discussion 
This section presents the results for different types of retailers as well as the collective 
findings for all retailers. For particular retail types, the focus is on why some types and 
chains are more clustered or dispersed than others. For the collective set of all 50 
retailers, the focus is on testing hypotheses that could be driving regional concentration 
and choice of market size. 
 
2.4.1 Implications of Retail Chain Heritage 
The first test is whether the size of the market in which retail stores are located is 
associated with the market size of the first store. The highest numbers of chains were 
founded and have stores in metropolitan areas with populations between one and seven 
million (Table 2.3). With a chi-square statistic of 3893 and 12 degrees of freedom, the p 
value is significant at the 0.01 level. The location of retail stores, with respect to market 
size, is significantly associated with the market size of the first store of the retailer. 
Specific examples are discussed in Section 4.2. 
Table 2.4 reveals greater detail based on the percentage of stores for each individual 
size of market given the market size of the first store location. Regardless of the original 
store location, the chains consistently deploy about one third of their stores in 
metropolitan areas with populations under one million. Chains founded in the largest 
metropolitan areas are more likely to have stores in large markets (14%) than chains 
founded in the smallest markets (4%), while chains founded in the smallest markets are 
more likely to have stores in the smallest of markets (21%) compared to chains founded 
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in the largest markets (4%). Although this bias is detected in the table, most retailers have 
the majority of their stores in medium sizes to larger markets. 
 
Table 2.3. Store Count by Market Size and First Store Market 
 
 STORES BY MARKET 
FIRST STORE MARKET 
Metropolitan 
7 million + 
Metropolitan 
1-7 million 
Metropolitan 
<1 million 
Micropolitan 
50,000-
200,000 
Micropolitan 
<50,000 or Non- 
Metro 
Metropolitan 7 million + 627 1942 1459 224 188 
Metropolitan 1-7 million 2959 13425 9939 1983 2077 
Metropolitan <1 million 1094 7792 7327 1756 2756 
Micropolitan or Non Metro 556 4357 5494 1688 3153 
 
 
2.4.2 Empirical Observations 
Each studied group of retailers is analyzed in terms of the national deployment patterns of 
its largest chains and the level and direction of regional clustering. Due to space 
limitations, maps are only shown for a few selected types. 
 
 
Table 2.4. Store Count by Market Size and First Store Market 
 
 STORES BY MARKET 
 
FIRST STORE 
MARKET 
Metropolitan 
7 million + 
Metropolitan 
1-7 million 
Metropolitan 
<1 million 
Micropolitan 
50,000-
200,000 
Micropolitan 
<50,000 or 
Non- Metro 
 
 
TOTAL 
Metropolitan 7 million + 14% 44% 33% 5% 4% 
 
100% 
Metropolitan 1-7 million 10% 44% 33% 7% 7% 
 
100% 
Metropolitan <1 million 5% 38% 35% 8% 13% 
 
100% 
Micropolitan or Non 
Metro 4% 29% 36% 11% 21% 
 
100% 
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2.4.2.1 Discount Department Stores 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the spatial mean centers (SMCs) and standard deviational ellipses 
(SDEs) of Walmart, Target, and Kmart, and Meijer—a large regional supercenter chain 
in the Midwest—as well as of the 7,000+ shopping centers. The shopping center SDE is 
largest, suggesting that the studied discount department stores all have some regional 
bias. Based on its SDE, Walmart has greater regional bias than Target. Walmart’s SMC 
location is the result of its ubiquitous presence in markets of various sizes in the 
Southeast, while Target has a strong presence in California, which pulls its SMC farthest 
west. Target has the most similar spatial patterns to those of the national shopping 
centers. Kmart’s SMC is in Illinois while the others are in Missouri, a result of Kmart 
closing many of its Sunbelt stores where Walmart is strong.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Regional Clustering of Discount Department Store Chains 
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Table 2.5. Studied Discount Department Stores 
Retailer 
Year 
Founded 
Store 
Count 
Percent 
Stores in 
Micro/Non 
 
Regional 
HH Index 
 
Std. Distance 
Distance from SMC of 
Pop Inc Retail 
Kmart 1962 1326 21.8% 27.1% 434.6 169 144 238 
Target 1962 1734 4.6% 27.3% 402.8 51 75 55 
Walmart 1962 3724 38.6% 33.4% 389.3 87 83 124 
Meijer 1934 187 11.2% 91.1% 49.5 469 442 545 
 
 
Walmart has more stores than Target, Kmart, and Meijer combined (Table 2.5). It has 
more stores in each state except Minnesota, where Target was founded and is currently 
headquartered, California, where Target opened some of its earlier stores by acquiring 
properties from other chains, and Michigan, the home of Meijer (Figure 2.2). These 
chains tend to have more stores in the areas closest to their first store locations, especially 
Walmart near its first store in Rogers, Arkansas. With nearly half of its stores in the 
South, Walmart has high regional concentration, denoted by its HHI (Table 2.5). It also 
has the highest level of deployment in smaller markets (nearly 39 percent); markets 
Target has mostly avoided to this point. Kmart still has many stores in the Midwest, near 
its first location in Garden City, Michigan, and current headquarters in Illinois. The oldest 
studied discount department store, Meijer, is also the most regionally concentrated, which 
goes against our age-concentration hypothesis.  
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2.4.2.2 Category Killers 
In this section we summarize the findings for category killers, or retailers that focus on a 
particular type of merchandise. Due to space limitations we include maps for only home 
improvement and office supply. Data are listed in Table 2.6. 
There are two major home improvement chains, Home Depot and Lowe’s, with 
national coverage and one particularly strong regional chain, Menards—each with 
different approaches to real estate deployment. Home Depot has 2,013 stores in the study 
area compared to 1,682 for Lowe’s, but there is a greater dispersion of Lowe’s stores 
between central Pennsylvania and eastern Texas. Home improvement provides another 
example where the hypothesis that chains that open their first stores in small markets tend 
to grow more often in other small markets seems to hold. Home Depot started in large 
market Atlanta and has 9 percent of its stores in micropolitan or non-metro markets, 
while Lowe’s started in the smaller market of North Wilkesboro, North Carolina and has 
18 percent small market penetration. 
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Table 2.6. Studied Category Killers 
 
Retailer 
Type of Retailer 
(NAICS) 
Year 
Founded 
Store 
Count 
Percent 
Stores in 
Micro/Non 
 
Regional  
HH Index 
 
Std. 
Distance 
Distance from SMC of 
Pop. Inc. Retail 
Home Depot Home Centers 1979 2013 9.5% 27.8% 413.0 29 41 77 
Lowe's  1921 1682 18.3% 33.2% 425.4 160 150 198 
Menards  1972 250 24.0% 99.2% 113.9 272 251 344 
Office Depot 
Office Supplies 
and Stationery 
1986 1119 5.1% 39.2% 405.3 207 234 131 
Office Max  1988 912 8.0% 28.9% 378.2 90 108 94 
Staples  1986 1663 12.5% 26.6% 457.2 174 151 240 
Petco 
Pet Supplies 
Stores 
1965 1053 5.2% 26.1% 398.8 127 143 124 
PetSmart  1987 1075 2.1% 28.4% 396.9 49 76 31 
Pet Supplies Plus  1988 228 7.5% 44.9% 229.3 537 512 605 
Big 5 Sporting 
Goods 
Sporting Goods 1955 385 8.1% 94.0% 197.3 1346 1362 1313 
Dick's Sporting 
Goods 
 1948 418 3.3% 27.9% 419.7 358 336 421 
Sports Authority  1987 472 1.9% 29.1% 371.6 184 206 147 
Barnes & Noble Book Stores 1917 705 1.4% 26.3% 413.5 11 16 90 
Books-A-Million  1917 224 13.8% 82.2% 186.2 501 494 515 
Borders  1962 493 2.8% 25.3% 440.9 17 22 93 
Advance Auto 
Parts 
Automotive Parts 
and Accessories 
1932 3326 21.7% 47.2% 244.4 475 460 512 
Auto Zone  1979 4233 18.2% 31.6% 403.5 84 108 33 
O'Reilly Auto Parts  1957 3438 23.4% 35.0% 324.4 394 415 349 
Hobby Lobby 
Hobby, Toy, and 
Game 
1972 447 9.8% 40.6% 224.3 80 97 64 
Michaels  1973 961 4.0% 26.6% 410.2 14 31 83 
Jo-Ann Fabric & 
Craft 
Sewing, 
Needlework, and 
Piece Goods 
1943 768 11.7% 25.9% 431.4 103 85 176 
Burlington Coat 
Factory 
Family Clothing 1972 427 0.9% 27.0% 439.3 170 152 224 
Marshalls  1956 734 3.1% 27.2% 448.7 156 140 207 
Ross  1957 950 4.5% 46.3% 369.1 472 498 408 
TJ Maxx  1977 912 5.6% 27.3% 458.5 226 205 285 
Bed Bath & 
Beyond 
All Other 
Miscellaneous 
1971 904 4.8% 26.8% 432.2 94 78 152 
Best Buy 
Household 
Appliance 
1966 1092 4.0% 27.4% 416.4 17 18 91 
Toys "R" Us 
Hobby, Toy, and 
Game 
1957 584 0.9% 26.5% 443.8 102 86 158 
Tractor Supply 
Nursery, Garden 
Center, and Farm 
Supply 
1938 855 40.4% 39.6% 304.7 300 282 349 
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Figure 2.3. Regional Clustering of Home Improvement Chains 
 
Similar to Walmart, Lowe’s has deployed stores in many smaller markets with a 
threshold size large enough to support a store. With many regularly spaced towns of 
adequate size in the Southeast, Lowe’s has a bias towards its roots in North Carolina 
(Figure 2.3). Lowe’s has the highest store count in most southeastern states except 
Georgia and Florida. These two states are more urban than others in the region, and 
Home Depot originated and is currently headquartered in Georgia. Home Depot’s 
deployment patterns are less regionally concentrated than Lowe’s as denoted by its lower 
HHI value (27.8% versus 32.2%) and more in line with national retail patterns, with 
greater store penetration in the West. Menards is a formidable regional competitor in the 
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upper Midwest. With its roots in the smaller metropolitan area of Eau Claire, Wisconsin, 
the chain has deployed nearly a quarter of its stores in smaller markets.  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Regional Clustering of Office Supply Stores 
 
The largest office-supply chains—Office Depot, Office Max, and Staples—have 
distinct regional patterns (Figure 2.4). Staples has a relatively large SD (457 miles) and 
low HHI (26 percent). To say that Staples lacks any regional concentration is somewhat 
misleading because it has a clustering of stores in the markets on opposite ends of the 
country, particularly the Northeast, near its first store, and California. Office Max has its 
highest concentration of stores in the Midwest, near its first store, and thus a lower SD 
(378 miles). Office Depot, founded in Florida, has a strong presence in the Sunbelt. 
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California, Texas, and Florida alone account for nearly 40 percent of its stores, leading to 
the directional tilt of the Office Depot SDE and its high HHI (39 percent). By 
comparison, just 24 percent of Office Max stores are located in the same three states. 
While Staples has over 500 more stores than either of its competitors, there are still 22 
states where Staples does not have the highest store count. These regional concentrations 
may be partially related to the relative youth of the chains. All three chains were founded 
between 1986 and 1988. These chains are all leaders in store count in their home regions.  
The largest auto parts chains—Advance Auto Parts, Auto Zone, and O’Reilly Auto 
Parts—have nearly 11,000 store locations combined and have been in existence for at 
least 30 years with Advance Auto Parts dating back to 1932. Despite its age, Advance 
Auto Parts is not necessarily mature from a real-estate perspective as it is still regionally 
concentrated in the East, with a standard distance of 244 miles, and HHI over 47 percent. 
It started in the smaller metropolitan area of Roanoke, Virginia and has nearly 22 percent 
of its stores in smaller markets. O’Reilly Auto Parts, which dates back to 1957, remains 
heavily saturated in Texas. Although the recent acquisition of CSK Auto for $542 million 
provided O’Reilly with 1,342 new stores in 22 states giving it a much greater presence in 
the Midwest and West (Lamiman 2010). Still, its HHI value is 35 percent. The chain 
started in a smaller metropolitan area—Springfield, Missouri—and has more than 23 
percent of its stores in small markets. Auto Zone has nearly 800 more stores than its next 
largest competitor, but only leads in fourteen states indicating the regional focus of its 
rivals. It also has the lowest percentage of small market stores of the three chains. Still, 
its 18 percent is high, having opened its first store in the small town of Forrest City, 
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Arkansas. Auto Zone’s SDE is most consistent with national patterns but still is 
somewhat biased towards the South (HHI=32 percent) with minimal coverage of the 
upper Midwest, where O’Reilly Auto Parts now has a strong presence. Collectively, these 
chains all have a southern bias with SMCs farther south than the retail, population, and 
income SMCs. In addition to small market deployment, this regional concentration may 
be because of lower sales thresholds associated with smaller stores or more fix-it-yourself 
customers in the poorer South. 
The following discussion highlights some noteworthy findings from the list of 
category killers. Barnes & Noble is more nationally dispersed than many of the other 
studied retailers. It has large market roots and little presence in small markets. Its largest 
brick and mortar competitor, Books-A-Million, has demonstrated a willingness to deploy 
in smaller markets (over 13 percent) and has remained regionally concentrated. It opened 
its first store in the smaller metropolitan area of Florence, Alabama. The deployment of 
sporting goods stores is highly regional. Dick’s Sporting Goods has regional 
concentration near its historical base with nearly a quarter of its stores in New York, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Big 5 has remained a regional chain in the West, often 
deploying in smaller markets. Family clothing chains—Burlington Coat Factory, 
Marshalls, and TJ Maxx—have an eastern bias with SMCs in Illinois. They each opened 
their first stores in the Northeast. Ross, founded in California, is by far the leading chain 
in western and many southern states. All four chains were founded in large markets and 
have mostly avoided small market locations. Hobby retailer Jo-Ann Fabric & Craft has 
greater focus in the northern states than Michaels, near its first store and headquarters in 
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Northeast Ohio. Michaels’ focus has been on larger markets: only 4 percent deployment 
in smaller markets. Bed Bath & Beyond and Toys “R” Us also have a slight eastern bias. 
Both opened their first store in the East and are currently headquartered in New Jersey. 
They also opened their first stores in larger markets and have mostly avoided smaller 
markets. The last statement holds true for Best Buy as well. Tractor Supply, which started 
in Minot, North Dakota, a micropolitan market, has its HHI and small market deployment 
at about 40 percent. Lastly, pet supply retailers—PetSmart, Petco, and Pet Supplies 
Plus—started in larger markets and have generally avoided deployment in small markets.  
 
2.4.2.3 Other Studied Retail Types 
The remaining analysis includes retail types that do not specialize in a particular focused 
line of merchandise, summarized in Table 2.7. We start by focusing on chains that attract 
lower income consumers. With multiple thousands of locations, these chains also provide 
numerous employment and shopping opportunities for small towns and economically 
challenged areas, especially in the South. We conclude this section by discussing 
warehouse chains and department stores. 
Dollar stores are growing in consumer popularity in recent times due to the economic 
challenges and consumers trading down (Brookman 2010). These chains continue to 
deploy stores aggressively even though the largest three—Dollar General, Dollar Tree, 
and Family Dollar—already have nearly 19,000 stores combined. Despite high store 
counts, there remains strong regional bias with low SD and high HHI, indicating 
opportunities for additional expansion and increased spatial competition. This also may 
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indicate a retail category that can heavily saturate an area with stores because of smaller 
store sizes and possibly lower rents and sales thresholds. Plus, the distance customers are 
willing to travel may be lower given that these chains offer low-order goods. Dollar 
General and Family Dollar alone have over 15,000 locations and many of these stores are 
in the Southeast. Dollar General has only penetrated 35 states, and Family Dollar does 
not have a store in California. Dollar General clearly has the most stores in the Southeast 
and lower Midwest while Family Dollar has the lead in the states surrounding the 
periphery of Dollar General’s presence where it has yet to deploy (Figure 2.5). These 
chains also have high deployment in smaller markets, with nearly forty percent of Dollar 
General stores. Dollar General’s first store was in small town Scottsville, Kentucky. 
Dollar Tree is the only large dollar store with national coverage, giving the chain a 
market share advantage in the West. 99 Cents Only Stores is a regional chain, rivaling 
Dollar Tree in California. The chain started in Los Angeles and has yet to deploy a store 
in a smaller market. The regional bias of these chains is also related to the locations of the 
first stores, with the three largest chains sharing a heritage in the Southeast. 
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Table 2.7. Other Studied Retailers 
 
Retailer 
Type of Retailer 
(NAICS) 
Year 
Founded 
Store 
Count 
Percent 
Stores in 
Micro/Non 
 
Regional 
HH Index 
 
Std. 
Distance 
Distance from SMC of 
Pop Inc Retail 
99 Cents Only 
Stores 
All Other General 
Merchandise 
Stores (Value) 
1982 268 0.0% 82.5% 327.2 1332 1352 1287 
Dollar General  1955 8577 39.4% 49.9% 221.7 289 279 315 
Dollar Tree  1986 3600 19.5% 29.9% 429.3 110 92 168 
Family Dollar  1959 6592 27.7% 38.6% 292.1 288 273 328 
Big Lots!  1982 1382 16.1% 31.1% 415.0 71 88 64 
Aaron's 
Consumer 
Electronics and 
Appliances 
Rental 
1955 1666 28.9% 38.5% 386.2 157 158 168 
Rent-A-Center  1973 3153 22.3% 31.1% 410.3 213 197 261 
BJ's Wholesale 
Club 
Warehouse Clubs 
and Supercenters 
1984 188 7.4% 50.2% 197.3 868 847 923 
Costco  1983 400 2.5% 36.7% 320.0 505 523 473 
Sam's Club  1983 597 4.5% 32.5% 360.8 108 106 135 
Belk 
Department 
Stores 
1888 302 35.4% 99.3% 170.5 542 534 559 
Dillard's  1938 307 5.9% 52.4% 311.4 250 271 185 
JCPenney  1902 1089 27.9% 28.8% 401.7 30 14 105 
Kohl's  1962 1067 6.1% 26.4% 431.3 70 43 148 
Macy's  1858 715 1.4% 26.2% 405.8 58 69 99 
Nordstrom  1901 111 0.0% 32.3% 315.4 381 400 344 
Sears  1925 1463 21.7% 28.0% 432.3 68 49 135 
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Figure 2.5. Regional Clustering of Dollar Store Chains 
 
Rental chains, Aaron’s and Rent-A-Center, also have a bias towards the Southeast, as 
does Big Lots, a value-oriented general merchandise retailer. Aaron’s has 28.9 percent of 
its stores in smaller markets and an HHI of 38.5 percent, while Rent-A-Center is lower on 
both metrics with 22.3 percent small market deployment and a 31.1 percent HHI. Big 
Lots has a slight southern bias and an HHI of 31 percent.  
Warehouse chains have strong regional bias, related to historical base of the retailers. 
Costco has the strongest presence in the West; Sam’s Club is most prevalent in the rest of 
the US, except for the Northeast where BJ’s has strong market share. The lowest HHI 
belongs to Sam’s Club (32.5 percent). The SMCs of the competitors are separated by at 
least 600 miles and they have fairly low SDs, all less than 360 miles. With these chains 
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starting in metropolitan areas, deployment in smaller markets has been minimal. These 
chains were founded in the early 1980s and have relatively low store counts. With room 
for expansion, warehouse chains provide a good example of a retail type that is relatively 
young from a real-estate deployment perspective. 
The largest department store chains—JCPenney, Kohl’s, Macy’s, and Sears—have 
relatively similar dispersed national coverage, high store counts, SMCs close to the 
national retail, income, and population SMCs, high SD over 400 miles, and low HHI 
values under 29 percent. Macy’s and Nordstrom, with roots in New York and Seattle 
respectively, have all but avoided any deployment in small markets. JCPenney, however, 
with its first store in small town Kemmerer, Wyoming, has more than a quarter of its 
stores in small markets. The number of markets of any size near Kemmerer is limited so 
JCPenney had to grow in other areas of the country. Belk and Dillard’s have a regional 
focus towards the South. Belk dates back to 1888 and has ample room for chain 
expansion while Sears, dating back to 1925, has a mature domestic network. Age does 
not seem to effect the national dispersion of department stores.  
 
2.4.3 Factors Affecting Regional Clustering 
The final analysis seeks to identify factors that explain the level of domestic regional 
concentration of retail stores, based on HHI and SD values. HHI and SD are strongly, yet 
not perfectly correlated (Table 2.8). The number of stores (STORES) and percentage in 
smaller markets (SMALL) are strongly correlated, consistent with the previous 
discussion that retail chains with high store counts would rely on small market 
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deployment. Another noteworthy correlation is between SMALL and the population of 
the market of the first store (POP_FIRST), as expected given the analysis in 4.1. There is 
some variation in how the other variables are correlated with HHI and SD values 
respectively. While SMALL is significantly associated with HHI and SD, STORES is 
only weakly correlated with HHI and is nearly perfectly uncorrelated with SD.  
 
Table 2.8. Correlation Matrix 
 
  HHI SD AGE STORES SMALL POP_FIRST 
HHI 1.000      
SD -0.847 1.000     
AGE 0.184 -0.167 1.000    
STORES -0.150 0.190 -0.960 1.000   
SMALL 0.228 -0.275 0.207 0.587 1.000  
POP_FIRST -0.530 0.199 0.170 -0.263 -0.415 1.000 
 
 
Despite evidence of some correlation between the independent variables and HHI and 
SD, nothing was strongly correlated. This may be a result of varying deployment 
strategies of different retail types. Figure 2.6 illustrates the relationship between standard 
distance and store count. The relationship is positive for most retail types (i.e. category 
killers with R² of 0.47). When considering all chains collectively, however, three retail 
types in particular disrupt the overall trend including auto parts, value (dollar), and rental 
stores. This may be a result of a variety of factors including smaller store sizes, cheaper 
rents, and the associated lower sales thresholds. Still, there are only two blatant examples 
of chains with a very high store count and low SD, Dollar General and Family Dollar. 
Standard distances may increase for these chains as they continue to move towards real-
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estate maturity. For other chains, maturity seems to occur closer to the one thousand store 
mark, although there are variations for different chains depending on value platforms and 
business practices. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Standard Distance and Store Count 
 
Removing auto parts, value (dollar), and rental chains, the remaining 41 retailers are 
placed into two OLS regression models with HHI and SD as the dependent variable in 
each model (Table 2.9). The independent variables include years since founded (AGE), 
store count (STORES), percent of stores not in metropolitan areas (SMALL), and the 
population of the metropolitan or micropolitan area of the first store (POP_FIRST). 
Removing auto parts, dollar, and rental chains reduces the correlation between STORES 
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and SMALL and SMALL and POP_FIRST respectively. In regards to multicollinearity, 
none of the correlation coefficients exceed the critical level of 0.7 (Clark and Hosking 
1986).  
With an inverse relationship between HHI and SD, the signs are consistent for both 
models. There are two variables that are significant in both (STORES and SMALL), with 
the hypothesized direction of the signs. Generally, opening more stores leads to lower 
levels of regional concentration and deploying in small markets leads to higher levels of 
regional concentration. The statistical significance of SMALL is important because the 
removed chains had thousands of store locations in smaller markets and high regional 
concentration. 
 
Table 2.9. Regression Results 
 
MODEL 1:  DEPENDENT VARIABLE (HHI) MODEL 2:  DEPENDENT VARIABLE (SD) 
R²: 0.446   n=41 R²: 0.488   n=41 
  Coefficients P-value   Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 0.456071 0.00000 Intercept 292.9449 0.00000 
AGE -0.000282 0.78120 AGE 0.351887 0.45124 
STORES -0.000208 0.00000 STORES 0.112776 0.00000 
SMALL 1.261622 0.00017 SMALL -554.2552 0.00097 
POP_FIRST 0.000000 0.85574 POP FIRST 0.000001 0.81927 
 
 
The hypothesis for AGE was that older chains would have had time to expand. 
Notwithstanding, no statistically significant relationship is found. Business practices vary 
and age is not statistically associated with regionalism. While some of the newer chains 
such as PetSmart and Staples have high standard distances, older chains like Belk still 
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have low SDs. Long-time regional chains may at some point decide to shift their real 
estate aspirations to a national scale. Also recall that Kmart, Target, and Walmart all 
opened their first stores in 1962 but are at different levels of real-estate maturity. 
Finally, POP_FIRST was not statistically significant. This is in part because of its 
relationship to SMALL. By removing SMALL from both models, POP_FIRST becomes 
statistically significant, in accordance with the hypotheses. The explanatory power of the 
models, however, is considerably reduced. 
 
2.5. Concluding Remarks  
This broad analysis examines the location patterns of major US retailers, individually and 
collectively. Despite the dramatic proliferation of chains to near or full national coverage, 
there are still strong regional biases of some of the largest retailers. Much of this regional 
bias was confirmed to be associated with store counts and small market deployment. 
Where the chain had its roots (heritage) was found to be influential as well, but not the 
age of the chain. Most chains saturated the markets near their first store locations. Also, 
chains that started in smaller markets tended to be more willing to deploy more stores in 
other small markets and vice versa for chains that started in larger markets. The greatest 
levels of regionalism were noted for most auto parts, warehouse, and value (dollar) 
chains and well-known national retailers like Walmart, Lowe’s, and Office Depot. The 
common thread is that these chains either have high numbers of small market stores or 
they have not yet reached real-estate maturity and have room to build their networks and 
substantially increase their store counts. 
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Opportunities for extension of this research include identifying the general processes 
of how chains spread over space and the influence of associated factors such as minimum 
trade area populations (thresholds). This article could also be adapted as a longitudinal 
study, focusing on how spatial mean centers and store distributions change over time. 
Studying diffusion along with the open dates of the stores, or when the companies 
became publically traded, can lead to additional opportunities for modeling. An 
investigation of when to anticipate alterations in chain strategy (e.g. international 
expansion, new store formats, sizing of stores) would also be beneficial. Finally, 
competitors can be studied based on their level of spatial competition juxtaposed to their 
current stage of real-estate maturity.  
The diffusion of retail chains across space is a dynamic process. Notwithstanding the 
general trends that affect regional concentration, individual business practices do impact 
deployment strategies. For instance, the distribution system can be a limiting factor on 
chain expansion leading to opening a new store in the “next market over” with an 
adequate threshold for some retailers. For mature chains with a developed national 
distribution system, however, attempting to identify areas for domestic growth becomes 
increasing challenging with every new store. It is inevitable that retailers eventually must 
find opportunities for new stores in areas that may not be familiar. Although this may be 
publicly promoted by a retailer as a new and exciting shift in strategy, these are merely 
adjectives to mask the reality of real-estate maturity. This is noted by the depletion of 
opportunities in desired options, an unwillingness to continually cannibalize existing 
stores, or in some cases desperation to satisfy investors with new store growth. 
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3. The Location Types of US Retailers 
3.1 Introduction 
Every year, most large US retail chains make dozens, if not hundreds, of locational 
decisions to open new stores or close existing ones. Locational decisions have internal 
and external impacts. The internal impacts are on the opportunities for new store growth 
and how to operate the stores within the framework of the locational diversity of the 
chain, while the external impacts are on communities, real-estate developers, co-tenants, 
competitors, and other stakeholders. While each location is evaluated individually in 
great detail, certain retailers tend to favor certain types of locations based on factors such 
as retail type (category killer, mass merchandiser, etc.), region, store count, store size, 
and urbanization. For example, according to its company website 
(corporate.familydollar.com), discount chain Family Dollar prefers 7,000 to 10,000 
square foot stores in neighborhood or convenience shopping centers or free-standing 
buildings that are near low-to-middle income segments of the population in its existing 
regions.  
Location types matter to retailers. Thrall (2002) used the term “value platform” to 
encapsulate the entire shopping experience that a consumer receives from the purchase 
and consumption of a good or service. The value platform includes factors such as 
personnel, service, and display of goods, as well as the situational aspects of store 
location. The type of location is not only part of the shopping experience, but has an 
effect on numerous other components of the business. For instance, retailers must decide 
how to present each store to the market, and whether they can be consistent across their 
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chain networks in building the brand in regards to product assortment, marketing, and 
other factors. Large chains, whether in store count or total square footage, need to appeal 
to many segments of the population in order to keep adding new store locations and thus 
they cannot always deploy stores in their most desired retail areas. Consider that 
Walmart, which has traditionally located in smaller towns or suburban areas, is attracting 
attention for its increasing presence in urban areas (D'Innocenzio and Beck 2011). One 
can find a retailer such as Staples (office supply) in the urban core, suburbs, and small 
towns situated in power centers, lifestyle centers, grocery-anchored neighborhood 
centers, super-regional centers, malls, stand-alone locations, or on the ground floor of 
skyscrapers. Retailers that can succeed in more diverse location types have more 
flexibility for expansion but may face a greater challenge of maintaining consistency. In 
this article, we attempt to establish the theoretical basis for locational decisions and the 
associated level of consistency of location types.  
Before we can evaluate the types and diversity of locations for large retail chains, we 
first need to develop a typology of retail locations. There is no comprehensive typology 
of retail locations in the academic literature. Further, aside from studies on a few 
particular chains such as Walmart (Zhu and Singh 2009) and others (Karande and 
Lombard 2005), there is minimal formal knowledge of the types of locations chosen by 
major U.S. retailers. The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC 1999) 
provides a classification of retail centers into categories such as neighborhood, power, or 
lifestyle centers, to name a few. Their classification system, however, is based on the 
characteristics of the retail property itself, not on the surrounding area. The suitability of 
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a retail location is determined not only by the site or center itself but also by situational 
factors, including proximity of other retailers off-site, accessibility, and characteristics of 
the customer base in the trade area.  Furthermore, the ICSC classification system covers 
only retail centers, not stand-alone store locations, which may comprise a large 
percentage of the stores of some chains.  
This article presents the results of an inductive analysis of the types of locations 
chosen by U.S. retailers using one of the largest cross-sectional databases of retailers ever 
assembled. With fifty of the largest retail chains, and over 70,000 store locations, we 
present two distinct cluster analyses. First, situational and trade area data at the 
geographical scale of the store are used to categorize the store locations into empirical 
groupings of retail locations types. Based on the clustering of individual stores, a second 
cluster analysis groups together the retailers with the most similar location profiles. 
Finally, the chains and categories of chains are analyzed based on factors that explain 
their location profiles. 
 
3.2 Relevant Literature 
Chain store retailing is complex because every store trade area will have various 
customer types. Consumer demographics affect the demand for products and responses to 
promotions. Furthermore, stores are in a number of different types of sites, situations, and 
competitive environments. In this treatment, we consider location types as encompassing 
both the site itself and the situational aspects including trade area demographics. As such, 
there may be considerable diversity among the location types chosen by retailers and 
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overall by categories of retailers. The following literature review is presented to address 
the factors behind this diversity and the resultant effects on the choice of why retailers 
choose particular location types. We also discuss how the structure of retailing is 
continually evolving based on consumer preferences, macroeconomic factors, 
technological innovations, and their impacts on store deployment.  
 
3.2.1 Customer Types 
There has been an exhaustive amount of research suggesting that not all consumers have 
the same shopping behaviors nor do they all react similarly to promotions (Stone 1954; 
Lumpkin, Hawes, and Darden 1986; Hortman et al. 1990; Burt and Gabbott 1995; 
Johnson-Hillery, Kany, and Tuan 1997; Theodoridis and Chatzipanagiotou 2009). 
Consumers develop attitudes towards products based on their needs, which are linked to 
demographic and lifestyle factors (Myers 1970). Most of the research has focused on the 
effects of specific socioeconomic factors such as age, household size, and income.  
Household dynamics affect the patronage decisions of many shoppers. Elderly 
shoppers with smaller household sizes have been found to be more price-conscious, more 
caring about their relationships with the staff, and less sensitive to location (Hortman et 
al. 1990; Burt and Gabbott 1995). Conversely, younger adults are highly responsive to 
convenience factors because they may be time-poor, especially those with growing 
families (Hortman et al. 1990). An interesting spatial dynamic is that younger adults tend 
to gravitate towards urban areas, especially for job opportunities (Garasky 2002). These 
younger consumers are also noted for their high levels of brand consciousness (Morton 
48 
 
2002; Noble, Haytko, and Phillips 2009) and brand loyalty (Noble, Haytko, and Phillips 
2009). Gable et al. (2008) found that college-aged women perceived discount stores to 
have more convenient locations, lower prices, and a wider variety of products whereas 
category killers (specialty retailers such as Best Buy in the electronics category) were 
perceived to have better service and deeper product lines, especially of well-known 
brands. Younger adult shoppers listed their most preferred retailers as Walmart, Target, 
and Best Buy, and preferred specialty stores more than older cohorts (Carpenter and 
Moore 2005). Given the connection between urbanization, youth, and brand awareness, it 
would seem that urban markets would have more stores in prime locations that feature 
brands whereas areas with older residents may have stores featuring more private labels. 
Research on shopping behavior has consistently found that lower-income households 
have greater price sensitivity (Hoch et al. 1995; Kalyanam and Putler 1997; Baltas and 
Argouslidis 2007). Carpenter and Moore (2006) found income and education were 
negatively associated with supercenter shopping while customer service was important to 
specialty shoppers. Shoppers list price as the most important reason for visiting Walmart 
(Arnold, Handelman, and Tigert 1998). Carpenter and Moore (2006) also found 
household size was positively associated with supercenter and warehouse club shopping 
and that African Americans preferred supercenters more than Caucasians. Gonzalez-
Benito, Bustos-Reyes, and Munoz-Gallego (2007) stressed, however, that failing to 
account for spatial convenience can overestimate the preference for store formats by 
various geo-demographic groups. Along those lines, retailers with low prices can perform 
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well in less-convenient locations with cheaper real estate costs given that consumers are 
willing to drive farther distances for the price savings (Grewal et al. 2012). 
 
3.2.2 Location Types 
Most research on customers has not accounted for their spatial proximity to the stores. 
Obviously, this research would not exist if every consumer had the same needs and 
motivations. This quickly becomes spatial when you consider that similar lifestyles tend 
to cluster in the same neighborhoods. The following discussions highlight more of the 
spatial factors relating to the stores and their trade areas. 
Many classical studies in retail geography have dealt with the classification of retail 
centers or markets. They are concerned with the type, size, and number of stores as well 
as the size of the trade area and location within the market. Various typologies have 
emerged including shopping malls, neighborhood centers, regional centers, specialty 
centers, and factory outlets. Retail centers tend to locate near one another and other stand-
alone retail because of agglomeration and zoning. Guy (1998) referred to unplanned 
clusters of centers as retail areas. Few studies have attempted to classify retail centers or 
areas based primarily on the populations served. Berry (1963) conducted a landmark 
study of retail centers (actually retail areas) in Chicago and found hierarchies of business 
ribbons along major highways, in planned centers, and in either high or low income 
areas. Brown (1991) took a view against hierarchies and instead identified four main 
variations in shopping centers including planned or unplanned clusters, linear retail along 
highways, and isolated retail. Vias (2004) used cluster analysis to identify five types of 
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non-metro US counties that experienced similar structural changes in retailing from 1988 
to1999. Hardin and Carr (2006) attempted to identify distinct retail types in order to 
determine appropriate rental rates based on site and trade area attributes.  
There have also been studies comparing the locational differences of competing 
retailers. For example, Zhu and Singh (2009) examined the geographic differentiation of 
mass merchandisers Walmart, Target, and Kmart. They found Walmart stores located 
near areas with larger household sizes, lower retail wages, lower incomes, and higher 
percentages of vehicle ownership. Conversely, Target stores were closer to areas of 
greater income, higher educational attainment, and more overall population. Kmart stores 
were somewhere in the middle of the income continuum. These results are not surprising 
given their value platform differences. As chains like Walmart and Target continue to 
expand their store counts past the point of real estate maturity, there may be less 
geographic differentiation between them in the future given that the traditionally chosen 
locations types have already been populated with stores (Joseph and Kuby 2013). 
Some chains have gravitated towards deployment in large retail areas. A general 
consensus in the literature is that agglomeration—the bundling of retail activities—
extends the size of trade areas because of the opportunities for multipurpose and 
comparison shopping (Cox 1959; O’Kelly 1983; Berman and Evans 1998; Oppewal and 
Holyoake 2004; Reimers and Clulow 2004). Consumers have proven to be willing to 
travel longer distances for multipurpose shopping (Ghosh and McLafferty 1987). Further, 
the risk of not finding desired products and services is reduced (Brown 1989). Price-
conscious shoppers benefit from visiting multiple competitors (Mittelstaedt and Stassen 
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1990). Karande and Lombard (2005) found that office supply stores (Office Depot, 
Office Max, Staples) and home improvement stores (Home Depot, Lowe’s) in three 
southeastern markets located near each other when the demographics were attractive. The 
agglomeration occurred mostly in areas of high income or density, young median ages, 
high retail expenditures, or high home ownership.  
 
3.2.3 Contemporary Trends in Retailing 
Location strategies of retailers are constantly evolving in response to structural changes 
in the overall retail marketplace. In the past few decades, the decline of the central 
business district (CBD) and the rise of niche retailing has caused a fundamental shift in 
where and how people shop. There has also been a shift in shopping habits and typology 
of store formats and concepts (Gable et al. 2008) and retail centers (Goss 1993). More 
recently, the economic crisis contributed to a plethora of store and chain closures and 
altered strategies by survivors. For example, there is now a movement towards 
refurbishing older facilities for new stores as opposed to the grandiose retail centers that 
proliferated across markets just a few years ago (Kukec 2011). We have also witnessed 
the increased popularity of low-cost, no-frills, discount stores with a limited assortment 
featuring private label brands, and their popularity extends beyond just low-income 
segments (Dekimpe et al. 2011). In response, specialty retailers are touting the overall 
shopping experience as their means of differentiation, which includes an increased focus 
on e-commerce. 
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E-commerce has become increasingly competitive with traditional brick-and mortar 
stores, especially with the rise of free shipping (Brynjolfsson et al. 2009). E-commerce 
has the advantage given that it reduces consumer search costs, especially for niche 
products which can be difficult to find. Dekimpe et al. (2011) discussed how some 
retailers have been able to reduce their store sizes and increase profitability by moving 
niche products from their stores to their web channel. Retailers are transitioning from 
offering a multi-channel experience, where its website competes with stores for sales, to 
an omni-channel experience, where both the web and the physical store work together to 
promote a seamless experience to the customer (Bodhani 2012). Participation in one 
channel can provide awareness and promote participation in another channel. Retailers 
are aggressively working towards becoming omni-channel because these customers 
spend more than multi-channel customers, which spend more than single-channel 
customers (Bodhani 2012). Given these trends, brick-and-mortar stores in the future may 
not need to be as large in size, but will still continue to play an important role as they are 
merged within the framework of the overall omni-channel experience. 
 
3.2.4 Literature Conclusions 
Despite all the research over the past several decades on shopper types, there is a dearth 
of knowledge concerning which kinds of retailers have greater exposure to particular 
segments of the population, and which types of locations are favored by retailers. This 
study is presented to address these issues and provide the field with a typology of 
domestic retail locations and discuss the factors that influence location choice.  
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Theoretical Background to Retail Store Deployment 
Although every retail company has its own strategic initiatives, most retailers open new 
stores to grow or protect sales or market share (Figure 3.1). Notwithstanding the level and 
sophistication of research invested by companies into the store deployment process, the 
ultimate choice of each individual location is made by key decision makers within the 
company, many times basing the final decision on experience or a “gut feel” (Hernandez 
and Bennison 2000). Ideally, these decision makers choose locations that are consistent 
with the chain’s value platform (Thrall 2002). Practically, this translates into searching 
for certain kinds of location types. For instance, specialty retail stores with higher prices 
may perform better in affluent metropolitan areas when faced with the ubiquitous 
competition of lower-priced discount stores. Depending on the type of store, there are 
more or fewer types of locations, and markets for that matter, that can provide a match 
between what they are selling and the potential customers nearby, and can support the 
sales thresholds of the stores. 
Although every location is unique, each individual store location is representative of 
a certain kind of location type. As discussed above, each retailer has one or more types of 
locations they typically search for and locate in, which we define here as the chain’s 
location profile. The location profile—or collection of location types—is a complex and 
evolving lynchpin of a retail chain’s overall value platform. To that end, the location 
profile affects, and is affected by, other aspects of the business, from merchandise 
54 
 
assortments to store formats (sizes, concepts, etc.) to international deployment. The 
expansion process is based on the availability of potential real estate as well as the ability 
of the chain’s stores to perform in a variety of settings and markets. In the simplified 
flowchart of Figure 3.1, the “Identify Potentially Suitable Sites” box lists the variables 
included in this study. Given this broad theoretical framework, the purpose of this article 
is to search inductively for general patterns in the types of location choices of large retail 
chains. Specifically, our objectives are to: 1) identify distinct location types based on key 
demographic and situational factors; 2) group together the chains with the most similar 
location types; and 3) generalize about the factors that affect deployment within and 
between the categories of retailers. 
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Figure 3.1.  Process of Chain Store Expansion 
 
3.3.2 Data 
This analysis is based on 70,470 retail stores of fifty of the largest U.S. retailers in the 
lower forty-eight states. This includes “category killers” such as PetSmart or Sports 
Authority, general mass merchandisers such as Walmart and Target, and other retail 
categories such as discount or rent-to-own stores. Home improvement and auto supply 
are treated as individual retail categories because of the vast size differences when 
compared to other category killers. These specialty retailers have different flexibilities 
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and requirements relating to real estate. Consider that a 25,000 square foot clothing store 
usually does not directly compete with a 150,000 square foot home improvement store or 
a 5,000 square foot auto supply store for the same space. The general criteria for 
choosing the studied chains were based on three factors: 1) rank of sales according to the 
2008 Fortune 1000 list; 2) minimum average store size of 2,500 square feet; and 3) more 
than one hundred store locations. Chains with smaller stores (e.g. GameStop or Bath and 
Body Works) were not included in this study as their level of individual store risk is not 
comparable to chains with larger stores. Only the standard and in some cases supercenter 
formats of the chains were studied. We also excluded supermarkets because of the high 
presence of various regional chains. Store locations were obtained from company 
websites and Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI). 
With the use of geographic information systems (GIS), store locations were geocoded 
and a ten-minute drive time was delineated as a proxy for each store’s trade area. The 
accuracy of the geocoding was reviewed by comparing the ten largest US markets against 
store locator results on the company websites. Although retail stores undoubtedly have 
variations in trade area size, the goal is to capture the characteristics of the immediate and 
surrounding areas of the stores that are accessible to the store. The most common form of 
trade area has been to use rings, such as five-mile rings used by Karande and Lombard 
(2005). A ten-minute drive time is generally somewhat comparable to a five-mile ring in 
terms of land area, but is more representative of a functional trade area, especially in 
areas of physical or political impediments. Shields and Kures (2007) used ten- and 
fifteen-minute drive time trade areas to study discount department stores. 
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3.3.3 Methods 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What are the location types of major U.S. retailers? 
Before we can make generalizations about location types of retailers, we first must 
develop a means of classifying locations into a typology. RQ1 is solved by clustering all 
70,470 store locations into smaller groups of similar location types, regardless of retailer 
affiliation. A location type identifies a group of stores with similar geographic factors 
including trade area factors—population density, household count, average household 
size, percent renters, population growth, average household income—as well as the 
number of other studied retail chains within 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) of the store and the 
presence of a limited-access highway ramp within 0.8 kilometers (0.5 miles) of store. 
Adjacency to highways can increase trade area size via increasing the travel speed of 
customers as well as awareness of the stores through signage or visibility from the 
highway. The other factors were selected as they are commonly considered by 
practitioners when evaluating potential sites and selecting analogs for forecasting sales. 
They are also distinguishing factors that affect the demand for products that consumers 
want and need to purchase. 
The SPSS Two-Step Clustering Component was used as the data-reduction method to 
develop empirical groupings of store locations. The advantage of this algorithm is its 
applicability to very large datasets and ability to accommodate both continuous and 
categorical variables (SPSS 2001). The first step involves pre-clustering the observations 
into many small sub-clusters. Each individual observation is either assigned to an existing 
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sub-cluster, or creates its own. The second step clusters the sub-clusters based on the 
predetermined number. In this case, solutions were evaluated from four to thirteen 
clusters. ANOVA tests were then used to ensure that the store type clusters are 
significantly different from each other. 
Despite the inductive nature of the analysis, we did have some hypotheses going into 
it. We expected that some retailers would favor sites that match targeted motivations, 
such as value or comparison shoppers. For instance, it was expected that general 
merchandise stores, value, rent-to-own, and auto supply stores would have greater 
deployment in low-to-medium income clusters. Department stores and category killers 
were expected to be found in larger retail areas because of agglomeration. 
 
RQ2: Which retailers have similar location types? 
A second cluster analysis uses the results from RQ1 to group together the most similar 
retailers based on their location profiles, or percent share of each location type within the 
total chain network for each retailer. The clustering algorithm is different from the one 
used to solve RQ1. We employ Ward’s minimum distance, an agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering method that maximizes the differences between the groups while minimizing 
the differences within groups (Rogerson 2001). Mathematically, it optimizes an F-
statistic. This method begins with every chain as a cluster of one, and continues to group 
the most similar clusters, one at a time, until there is only one left. It should be noted 
though that one of the weaknesses of the method is that once an observation is assigned 
to a cluster, it cannot be undone (Tan et al. 2006). The distance measure is squared 
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Euclidean distance. As one of the most commonly chosen distance types, squaring the 
standard Euclidean distance places greater weight on objects that are further apart in 
multi-dimensional space. Dendrograms are provided to visualize the results. The specific 
number of clusters is not predetermined but unveils during the analysis. ANOVA testing 
reveals whether the F-statistics are high and significant. The output also includes a pie 
chart showing the collective proportion of location types for the retailers that fall in the 
same group. Competitors are compared on the basis of their cluster membership. 
The output from the second cluster analysis helps identify the store deployment 
strategies of the chains by revealing which chains choose similar types of store locations. 
In addition to the cluster analysis, we calculate a Gini coefficient for each chain as a 
diversity index to measure the degree to which chains spread their stores across a greater 
variety of location types or concentrate them among fewer types (e.g. Imbs and Wacziarg 
2003). 
We hypothesized that value, rent-to-own, and general mass merchandise stores such 
as Walmart and Kmart would have similar profiles featuring stores in low- to medium-
income location segments. Target, a general merchandiser with a more upscale value 
platform, was expected to cluster with book stores, with both having more stores 
categorized in middle- or higher-income clusters in RQ1. Home improvement retailers 
were expected to cluster with category killers such as pet supply, featuring many stores in 
areas with more single-family homes.  
The final part of solving RQ2 is to examine deployment in the various location types 
by the category of retailer. We compare chains within and between groups on the basis of 
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factors such as percent of stores deployed in micropolitan or non-metropolitan areas. We 
hypothesized that larger stores (in square feet) and specialty retailers are more likely to 
choose location types in urban areas, which adds to our generalizations of retail 
deployment by location. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Retail Types 
To analyze location types by retailers and retail categories, we first identify a total of 
twelve distinct retail location types with the cluster analysis of all 70,470 store locations 
regardless of chain membership. Distinct clusters, with obvious interpretations, were still 
appearing after splitting into ten and eleven different groups. After twelve, however, the 
differences were becoming less obvious. These clusters are listed with their group 
number and a fitting cluster name (Table 3.1). Diagnostics using ANOVA are significant 
at the 0.05 level with high F-statistics providing confidence in the differentiation of the 
clusters. 
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Table 3.1.  Retail Location Types and Averages 
Type Count 
Pop. 
Density 
House-
holds 
Hhold 
Size Renters 
Pop. 
Growth 
Hhold 
Income 
HWY 
½ mi 
Retail 
1 mi 
(1) Convenient Highway 
Retail 6,085 1,528 38,535 2.38 34.8% 0.36% $58,157 1.00 4.4 
(2) Large Retail 
Areas Near Highways 4,865 2,150 53,243 2.50 37.2% 0.96% $66,499 1.00 15.0 
(3) Urban Highway 3,749 4,812 125,314 2.82 44.5% 0.85% $68,722 1.00 5.8 
 
(4) High Growth and 
Income Areas Near 
Highways 3,453 2,178 45,786 2.74 26.5% 2.42% $97,120 1.00 7.5 
(5) Small Town 18,414 620 10,475 2.41 27.8% 0.27% $51,644 0.00 2.8 
(6) Isolated Retail 10,637 2,667 60,219 2.38 39.7% 0.45% $62,641 0.00 3.9 
(7) Large Retail Areas 7,356 1,735 36,360 2.38 34.9% 0.59% $61,095 0.00 14.1 
(8) Affluent Areas 5,065 2,306 42,501 2.71 24.0% 1.39% $100,759 0.00 6.7 
(9) Metro Neighborhood 3,041 7,344 164,630 2.77 46.6% 0.51% $74,535 0.00 5.5 
(10) Large Family Areas 3,636 2,583 44,246 3.12 35.4% 1.55% $59,787 0.00 5.0 
(11) High Growth Areas 3,274 1,162 18,464 2.71 21.1% 4.47% $73,037 0.01 3.3 
(12) Dense Urban Areas 895 22,755 589,862 2.55 62.3% 0.43% $75,612 0.39 5.8 
 
 
(1) Convenient Highway Retail 
This type of store location is found in smaller retail areas near limited-access highways. 
The trade areas have smaller household sizes and the second-lowest population growth 
and income. The chains with the most stores in this type attract value-oriented customers 
(i.e. Dollar General and Walmart). Retailers that are common to these locations mostly 
have destination stores with high square footage. It is the leading location type for Home 
Depot. Menards, another home improvement chain, has 20 percent of its stores in this 
type.  
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 (2) Large Retail Areas Near Highways 
These stores have the highest presence of other national chains, averaging fifteen per 
store. They are located near limited-access highways. This is the leading store type for 
department store mall anchors, Dillard’s and Macy’s. This is also the leading type for 
category killers such as Best Buy (electronics), Borders
1
 (books), Ross (clothing), Sports 
Authority (sporting goods), and Toys “R” Us (hobby). Best Buy has the most stores 
followed by department store Sears and Target, a general mass merchandiser.  
  
(3) Urban Highway 
This type of store is near limited-access highways, with high household counts and 
renters in medium-sized retail areas. The highest store count belongs to value chain 
Family Dollar, followed by Auto Zone (auto parts) and Home Depot. The only chain with 
this as its leading location type is Big 5 Sporting Goods. The highest share percentage 
belongs to 99 Cents Only Stores, another value-oriented retailer.  
 
(4) High Growth and Income Areas Near Highways 
These location types are in high-growth areas near limited-access highways, rank second 
in income, and have a medium presence of other chains. Home Depot is the store count 
leader, again demonstrating its diverse location types. General mass merchandisers 
Target and Walmart have many stores in these kinds of locations. It is the leading 
                                                 
1
 During the time of the study, Borders closed all of its stores. 
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location type for the upscale department store Nordstrom and warehouse club Costco. 
About one of every eight Best Buy and Kohl’s (department store) is found in this group. 
 
(5) Small Town 
This distinctive group of locations is lowest in population density, households, population 
growth, income, and presence of other major retailers. It is also the largest group with 
more than 26 percent of the studied stores. Discount store Dollar General is the leader in 
both store count and share. Family Dollar, with a similar value platform, has 45 percent 
of its stores in this location type. Other chains with high share include farm-oriented 
Tractor Supply; discounters Walmart, Kmart, and Big Lots; rental chains Aaron’s and 
Rent-A-Center; auto supply chains O’Reilly Auto Parts, Advance Auto Parts, and Auto 
Zone; home improvement chain Menards; and department stores Belk, Sears, and 
JCPenney.  
 
(6) Isolated Retail 
This type of store location is separated spatially from most other national retailers. The 
trade areas have average population density, household counts, and income. The leader in 
overall count is Family Dollar. Many of these stores are in older commercial areas, 
evident by the lack of population growth. The leader in own-store share is Pet Supplies 
Plus followed by Rent-A-Center. This cluster is well represented by the auto parts chains 
and chains with value-oriented customers such as Aaron’s, Big Lots, Burlington Coat 
Factory, Dollar Tree, and Kmart.  
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(7) Large Retail Areas 
This location type is similar to (2) Large Retail Areas Near Highways, except the stores 
are not adjacent to limited-access highways. This is the leading location type for fifteen 
chains, mostly category killers, i.e. Barnes & Noble and Books-A-Million (book stores), 
Bed Bath & Beyond (home goods); Dick’s Sporting Goods; Hobby Lobby,  Jo-Ann 
Fabrics, and Michael’s (hobby); Office Max; Petco, PetSmart, and Pet Supplies Plus; TJ 
Maxx (clothing); and Toys “R” Us.  The leader in store count is Dollar Tree, followed by 
Walmart, Rent-A-Center, Sears, JCPenney, and Target. 
 
(8) Affluent Areas 
These stores are in medium-sized retail areas, serving an affluent and expanding 
population base. The leader in overall store count is Dollar Tree, demonstrating its appeal 
beyond low-income and small-town consumers. Auto parts stores also are common in 
these locations as well as Target, Walmart, and Staples (office supply), among others. 
Book stores, pet supply, and some other category killers also have considerable shares, as 
does BJ’s Wholesale Club. 
 
(9) Metro Neighborhood 
These stores are located in established, dense areas. There is a high percentage of renters 
and above average income with some retail presence nearby. The store count leader is 
Auto Zone. The other auto supply chains are well represented, as is Home Depot, Staples 
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(office supply), and Target. Value-oriented chains—Rent-A-Center, Dollar Tree, Family 
Dollar, and 99 Cents Only Stores—have many stores in this type of location. 99 Cents 
Only Stores is the only chain with this as its leading type, again demonstrating the 
exposure of discount stores to affluent consumers.  
 
(10) Large Family Areas 
These stores have the highest average household size in their trade areas. The incomes 
are modest and these neighborhoods are expanding. The leader in store count is Family 
Dollar, followed by Auto Zone. The other auto parts chains and discounters, rent-to-own, 
and dollar stores have considerable presence. No chain has its highest number of stores in 
this group. The leader in share is 99 Cents Only Stores. Most nationally deployed 
category killers have avoided deployment in this type of location, although regionally 
deployed Big 5 Sporting Goods has some presence. 
 
(11) High Growth Areas 
These locations are in low density areas, but with rapid population growth. Chains that 
deploy stores in this kind of site may not follow the “rooftops before retail” mantra of 
real estate practitioners. With only 3.3 other major retailers within a close proximity, 
these stores are often the pioneers that are among the first to move into these areas. The 
leader in store count and share is Dollar General. The auto parts and home improvement 
chains are well represented as is Walmart. No chain has this as its top location type.  
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 (12) Dense Urban Areas 
This is the smallest location type in size, representing just over one percent of stores. This 
cluster is by far the leader in density, household counts, and renters. Family Dollar has 
the highest store count, followed by Staples and Auto Zone. While no chain has its 
highest proportion in this group, the highest share belongs to office supply chain Staples. 
99 Cents Only Stores has some of this type of location as do department stores Macy’s 
and Nordstrom, each about 5 percent. Borders also had some of these stores prior to its 
closing. Fourteen of the chains have fewer than five stores in this location type including 
Walmart and Dollar General. 
 
3.4.2 Discussion of Location Types 
Given the differences among the location types, it is not surprising that there are parts of 
markets where particular location types are more likely to be found. For example, Figure 
2 provides an example of the location types of the second largest discount department 
store chain (general mass merchandiser), Target, in the Chicagoland area and its adjacent 
hinterland. Granted, the Chicagoland area is one of the largest markets in the study, and 
includes the city of Chicago and its surrounding suburbs. It was chosen because it was 
large and diverse enough to have all types of locations for a particular retailer (i.e. 
Target). The lack of extreme changes in topography also allows for a gradual decrease in 
population density from the urban center (i.e. Chicago Loop). From the figure, (12) 
Dense Urban Areas stores arrange themselves around, and in some cases in, the central 
business district. For this particular retailer, and in this particular metropolitan area, there 
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are far and away more stores that have location type of (8) Affluent Areas. That being 
said, many of these stores are in the suburbs somewhat far from the urban core, with 
more on the wealthier north side of Chicago. In between the urban core and the suburban 
areas, there are several stores with the location type of (9) Metro Neighborhood. There 
are a few examples of large retail areas (Groups 2 and 7). Group 11, High Growth Areas, 
can be detected in the Southwestern part of the Chicagoland area. Finally, there are a few 
stores in (5) Small Town, on the extreme ends of the hinterland, in neighboring states. 
There are relationships between the clusters and varying degrees of similarities and 
differences. For example, (1) Convenient Highway Retail is similar to (2) Large Retail 
Areas Near Highways, but the trade area demographics are more attractive for store 
deployment in (2) because of more households and higher levels of density, income, and 
growth. With a sufficient population base to support the sales thresholds of these 
retailers, more chains locate stores in this location type, especially specialty retailers, 
which have clearly targeted these locations. (2) Large Retail Areas Near Highways is 
similar to (7) Large Retail Areas, with the difference being in the immediate highway 
access. The highway accessibility extends the size of the trade areas and the number of 
households. Granted, some of the stores in (2) may be located close to stores in (7). There 
is a strategic reason to locating in the immediate vicinity of a limited-access highway and 
retailers such as Best Buy may be more likely to “pay up” for real estate sites closer to 
the highways while many other category killers have deployed more stores in the larger 
retail areas but not next to highways. Conversely, chains with an upscale value platform 
and most category killers (specialty retailers) are not often found in (5) Small Towns or 
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(6) Isolated Retail. It is possible that the stores in (6) Isolated Retail were at one time in a 
major shopping area for their community. Over time, however, other retailers may have 
relocated to other parts of the markets and legacy chains like Kmart were left behind as 
the market changed around them. (12) Dense Urban Areas stores may be a location type 
targeted for growth as mature chains like Walmart continue to seek places for new 
deployment.  
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Figure 3.2.  Example: Target Locations by Type in the Chicagoland Area 
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3.4.3 Retailers with Similar Location Profiles 
The studied chains have varying levels of deployment in particular location types. Some 
chains have been more willing to open stores in a variety of types while others have 
focused their deployment in just a few. Table 3.2 provides the top three location types for 
each studied chain, arranged by retail category, that is, by the kinds of goods sold in the 
stores. The table also includes a diversity index (Gini coefficient) to evaluate the chains 
based on their deployment in a variety of situations. Gini coefficients closer to zero 
represent a more diverse location profile, whereas a value of 1 would indicate that all of 
their locations were concentrated within a single type. The chains with the most diverse 
location profiles include Home Depot, Staples, Ross, Target, and Big 5 Sporting Goods 
while the least diverse (larger Gini coefficients) are Dollar General, Family Dollar, 
Tractor Supply, 99 Cents Only Stores, and Advance Auto Parts. Aside from 99 Cents 
Only Stores, the other low-diversity chains tend to have a considerable presence in (5) 
Small Towns. Although a chain like Advance Auto Parts has penetrated into denser areas, 
it is still overweight in small market deployment. Given that small markets outnumber 
large markets, chains with preference for small market deployment tend to have lower 
Gini coefficients. At the other end of the diversity spectrum, three of the top nine most 
diverse chains are office supply, which tend to locate more in metropolitan markets. We 
revisit the effects of urbanization later in this section. 
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Table 3.2.  Leading Location Types and Gini Coefficient of each Chain, Sorted by Retail 
Category 
CATEGORY 
LEADING 
TYPES* GINI CATEGORY 
LEADING 
TYPES* GINI 
SPECIALTY (CATEGORY KILLER)   DEPARTMENT STORE   
Staples (Office Supply) 8 (13%), 7, 6 0.22 Kohl’s 7 (16%), 8, 4 0.33 
Office Depot (Office Supply) 6 (15%), 7, 3 0.29 Macy’s 2 (19%), 7, 3 0.39 
Office Max (Office Supply) 7 (17%), 2, 8 0.31 Sears 5 (21%), 7, 2 0.40 
Big 5 (Sporting Goods) 3 (15%), 10, 9 0.28 Nordstrom 4 (18%), 3, 8 0.42 
Sports Authority (Sporting Goods) 2 (20%), 4, 7 0.40 JCPenney 7 (23%), 5, 2 0.46 
Dick’s (Sporting Goods) 7 (23%), 2, 8 0.46 Dillard’s 2 (28%), 7, 6 0.51 
Ross (Clothing) 2 (14%), 7, 3 0.26 Belk 5 (32%), 7, 1 0.54 
Marshalls (Clothing) 8 (15%), 6, 7 0.29 WAREHOSUE   
Burlington Coat Factory (Clothing) 6 (19%), 7, 2 0.37 BJ’s Wholesale Club 8 (16%), 6, 2 0.31 
TJ Maxx (Clothing) 7 (22%), 8, 2 0.40 Costco 4 (17%), 3, 2 0.36 
Petco (Pet Supply) 7 (16%), 8, 2 0.31 Sam’s Club 7 (18%), 2, 1 0.40 
PetSmart (Pet Supply) 7 (19%), 2, 8 0.37 HOME IMPROVEMENT   
Pet Supplies Plus (Pet Supply) 6 (25%), 7, 8 0.54 Home Depot 1 (14%), 8, 7 0.22 
Barnes & Noble (Books) 7 (20%), 2, 8 0.37 Lowe’s 5 (19%), 1, 7 0.35 
Borders (Books) 2 (17%), 8, 7 0.37 Menards 5 (27%), 1, 6 0.52 
Books-A-Million (Books) 7 (23%), 1, 6 0.46 DISCOUNT STORE   
Michael’s (Hobby) 7 (22%), 2, 8 0.42 Dollar Tree 5 (23%), 6, 1 0.40 
Jo-Ann Fabric (Hobby) 7 (23%), 6, 2 0.43 Big Lots 5 (22%), 6, 7 0.41 
Hobby Lobby (Hobby) 7 (28%), 6, 2 0.45 99 Cents Only Stores 9 (30%), 3, 10 0.56 
Toys “R” Us (Hobby) 2 (24%), 7, 8 0.47 Family Dollar 5 (45%), 6, 10 0.63 
Bed Bath & Beyond (Home) 7 (22%), 2, 8 0.39 Dollar General 5 (62%), 6, 11 0.73 
Best Buy (Electronics) 2 (21%), 7, 4 0.40 RENTAL STORE   
MASS MERCHANDISER   Rent-A-Center 5 (28%), 6, 1 0.49 
Target 7 (15%), 8, 2 0.27 Aaron’s 5 (33%), 6, 7 0.54 
Kmart 5 (27%), 6, 1 0.44 AUTO SUPPLY   
Walmart 5 (34%), 1, 6 0.47 Auto Zone 5 (28%), 6, 10 0.46 
Meijer 5 (18%), 1, 7 0.48 O'Reilly Auto Parts 5 (32%), 6, 10 0.47 
Tractor Supply 5 (45%), 1, 7 0.61 Advance Auto Parts 5 (35%), 6, 1 0.55 
      
*Percent given for top location type for each retailer. 
Location Types: (1) Convenient Highway Retail  (2) Large Retail Areas off Highways  (3) Urban Highway  (4) High Growth and 
Income Areas off Highways  (5) Small Town  (6) Isolated Retail  (7) Large Retail Areas  (8) Affluent Areas  (9) Metro 
Neighborhood  (10) Large Family Areas  (11) High Growth Areas  (12) Dense Urban Areas 
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The retail categories in Table 3.2 are an a priori grouping based on common 
terminology used by the retail industry and/or the general public. From Table 3.2, there 
appear to be some noticeable trends among similar retailers, such as specialty chains 
having their most stores in large retail areas and discount stores favoring smaller markets 
for deployment. The second cluster analysis goes beyond these subjective observations to 
quantitatively group together the chains with the most similar location types. A 
hierarchical cluster analysis is performed on the 50x12 matrix of each chain’s percentage 
distribution across the twelve location types. Figure 3.3 is the cluster dendrogram 
illustrating the cluster building process from left to right as the cluster analysis proceeds 
to higher levels of generalization, with fewer (and broader) clusters and less similar 
chains being grouped together. Initially, the stage one groupings include: 
  
1. Mass merchandiser Target, and specialty retailers Petco (pet supplies) and Office 
Max (office supply), which locate in a variety of situations (high diversity); 
2. Office Depot (office supply) and Burlington Coat Factory (clothing), which favor 
interior urban locations; 
3. Specialty retailers Toys “R” Us (hobby) and Best Buy (electronics), which deploy 
in the larger retail areas, especially near limited-access highways; 
4. Specialty retailers Michael’s (hobby), PetSmart (pet supplies), and Bed Bath & 
Beyond (home goods), which also are deployed in large retail areas but more 
stores are removed from immediate highway adjacency; 
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5. Specialty retailers TJ Maxx (clothing) and Barnes & Noble (books), with a 
preference for higher income segments; 
6. Department stores Sears and JCPenney, mall stalwarts that are commonly in large 
retail areas and also have a heavy presence in (5) Small Towns; 
7. Discounters Dollar Tree and Big Lots, with a large share in (6) Isolated Retail; 
and 
8. Auto supply chains O’Reilly Auto Parts and Auto Zone—heavy in Groups 5, 6, 
and 10 (Large Family Areas)—demonstrating their ability to deploy in the 
smallest of markets and the urban areas, many times removed from other major 
retailers. 
 
Stage two groupings include Marshalls (clothing) and BJ’s Wholesale Club 
(warehouse); Staples (office supply) and Home Depot (home improvement); hobby 
chains JoAnn and Hobby Lobby; and rental chains Rent-A-Center and Aaron’s. In 
addition, Kmart, a mass merchandiser, joins the group already occupied by discounters 
Dollar Tree and Big Lots. In stage three, Nordstrom, an upscale department store, joins 
Costco (warehouse); Kohl’s (department store) joins the group already occupied by 
Target, Petco, and Office Max; Sports Authority (sporting goods) groups with Borders 
(books); and Dick’s Sporting Goods combines with other category killers Bed Bath & 
Beyond, Michael’s, and PetSmart. In stage four, Macy’s (department store) joins Best 
Buy and Toys “R” Us; the Dick’s Sporting Goods, Bed Bath & Beyond, Michael’s, and 
PetSmart group unites with the TJ Maxx and Barnes & Noble group; and Advance Auto 
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Parts joins with Rent-A-Center and Aaron’s, chains with high deployment in (5) Small 
Towns. Advance Auto Parts joins later with its competitors Auto Zone and O’Reilly Auto 
Parts because of its level of small market deployment. Finally, two discounters—Dollar 
General and 99 Cents Only Stores—are the last two chains to be assigned to a cluster. 
The location profiles of these chains are distinct because of their propensity to locate in 
isolation of other major retailers. 
After fourteen stages, there are eight distinguishable groups of similar retailers, which 
we find to be an insightful level of generalization. Two groups have only one member. 
The remaining six groups range from to four to eleven chains. ANOVA tests reveal that 
these clusters are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. A summary of each of the 
eight groups at this stage is also provided, with pie charts illustrating their proportions of 
location types (Figure 3.4). 
Group A (Big 5 Sporting Goods, Costco, Nordstrom, and Ross) includes chains that 
locate in a variety of situations but favor urban deployment. An interesting connection 
between these chains is that they all started in large West Coast markets. Group B 
includes a variety of chains including all three office supply chains. Group C includes 
many of the category killers and Macy’s. The difference between groups B and C is that 
although they both often locate in larger retail areas, Group B chains have deployed more 
often in smaller retail areas, denoting greater real estate flexibility. Group E includes 
three chains—Dillard’s, JCPenney, and Sears—that are common mall anchors. It is 
common for small markets to contain malls but not adjacent power centers with a high 
number of nationally deployed category killers. Group E also has deployed in large retail 
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areas most often but has been willing to deploy in small markets much more than the 
chains in Groups B and C.  
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Cluster Dendrogram on Location Types 
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Figure 3.4.  Clusters of Similar Chains 
2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 1 
RETAILER GROUP A 
Members: Big 5, Costco, Ross, 
Nordstrom 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 3 (Urban Highway): 13.3% 
Gini coefficient: 0.254 
RETAILER GROUP B 
Members: BJ’s, Burlington Coat 
Factory, Home Depot, Kohl’s, 
Marshalls, Office Depot, Office 
Max, Petco, Staples, Target 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 7 (Large Retail Areas): 
14.0% 
Gini coefficient: 0.248 
RETAILER GROUP C 
Members: Barnes & Noble, Bed, 
Bath, & Beyond, Best Buy, Borders, 
Dick’s, Macy’s Michael’s, 
PetSmart, Sports Authority, TJ 
Maxx, Toys “R” Us 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 7 (Large Retail Areas): 
19.9% 
Gini coefficient: 0.385 
RETAILER GROUP D 
Member: 99 Cents Only Stores 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 9 (Metro Neighborhood): 
19.9% 
Gini coefficient: 0.564 
RETAILER GROUP E 
Members: Books-A-Million, 
Dillard's, Hobby Lobby, Jo-Ann, 
JCPenney, Lowes, Meijer, Pet 
Supplies Plus, Sam’s Club, Sears 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 7 (Large Retail Areas): 
19.5% 
Gini coefficient: .303 
RETAILER GROUP G 
Members: Aarons, Advance Auto 
Parts, Auto Zone, Family Dollar, 
O’Reilly Auto Parts, Rent-A-Center 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 5 (Small Town): 35.0% 
Gini coefficient: 0.516 
RETAILER GROUP F 
Members: Belk, Big Lots, Dollar 
Tree, Kmart, Menards, Tractor 
Supply, Walmart 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 5 (Small Town): 28.9% 
Gini coefficient: 0.437 
RETAILER GROUP H 
Members: Dollar General 
Dominant Location Type: 
Group 5 (Small Town): 62.2% 
Gini coefficient: 0.730 
KEY 
6 
(1) Convenient Highway Retail 
(2) Large Retail Areas Near Highways 
(3) Urban Highway 
(4) High Growth & Income Areas Near Hwys 
(5) Small Town 
(6) Isolated Retail 
(7) Large Retail Areas 
(8) Affluent Areas 
(9) Metro Neighborhood 
(10) Large Family Areas 
(11) High Growth Areas 
(12) Dense Urban Areas 
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The remaining groups feature many chains that cater to value-minded consumers. 
Many of these chains have their heritage in the South. Group D includes only 99 Cents 
Only Stores while Group H includes only Dollar General. Although they have similar 
concepts, 99 Cents Only Stores focuses on urban deployment while Dollar General has 
the greatest focus on small markets of any studied retailer. Groups F and G also have 
considerable but varying degrees of small market deployment. Group F includes mass 
merchandisers such as Kmart and Walmart. They deploy stores often in small markets but 
have more deployment in larger retail areas than Group G, which includes the auto parts 
and rent-to-own chains, as well as Family Dollar. The stores in Group G generally have 
smaller building sizes than those in Group F, allowing greater flexibility of locating in 
smaller retail areas and smaller markets. 
 
3.4.4 Generalizations by Retail Type 
We observed in the previous discussions that retailers with similar value platform 
characteristics showed a propensity for having similar location profiles. As the cluster 
analysis generalizes further, the domestic deployment patterns of U.S. retail chains 
appear to be more systematic than random. Figure 3.3 shows the eight clusters of chains 
reduced down to three, which we have labeled 1) Metro, 2) Large Retail, and 3) Small 
Market. For each of the commonly used a priori retail categories introduced initially in 
Table 3.2, we have listed the percentage of chains that were clustered into these Metro, 
Large Retail, and Small Market clusters (Table 3.3). The table also lists the average 
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aggregated square footage and the percentage of stores in smaller markets, defined as 
micropolitan or non-metro areas. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Deployment by Retail Categories by Store and Market Size 
 
COUNT OF CHAINS 
BY CLUSTER TYPES   
RETAIL CATEGORY: Metro 
Large 
Retail 
Small 
Market 
Overall 
Average Square 
Footage 
Overall 
Average Percent 
Micro/Non-Metro 
Specialty (Category Killer) 18 4 0 29,018 5.6% 
Mass Merchandiser 1 1 3 136,475 27.8% 
Department Store 3 3 1 121,184 16.3% 
Warehouse 2 1 0 133,203 4.3% 
Home Improvement 1 1 1 138,227 14.2% 
Discount Store 1 0 4 10,208 30.0% 
Rental Store 0 0 2 5,841 24.6% 
Auto Parts 0 0 3 7,187 20.9% 
Overall Average Square 
Footage by Cluster 56,974 109,168 28,273   
Overall Average Percent 
Micro/Non-Metro by Cluster 5.2% 16.8% 27.9%   
 
 
The Metro group includes retailers that favor locations in urban areas, denoted by the 
low value of micropolitan and non-metropolitan deployment. It is dominated by category 
killers. Although these chains favor stores in the biggest markets, they are not the largest 
in terms of square footage. For most category killers, the value platform supersedes size 
in terms of what kind of markets can currently support these stores with their standard 
formats. The Large Retail cluster includes chains that locate in large retail areas, 
regardless of overall market size. It is the smallest cluster but three of the chains are 
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department stores, a byproduct of smaller markets where the shopping mall is the primary 
focus of retail activity. Thus, the square footages are high. Finally, the Small Market 
cluster has chains with smaller stores in smaller markets, and chains with value platforms 
oriented towards low-income customers. Not all stores in small markets are small in size, 
however, as three of the mass merchandisers have their focus here. The smaller markets 
can support the largest stores more easily than they can support smaller specialty stores.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
We have presented one of the most comprehensive empirical studies on retail geography 
in the United States. In this article, we developed a location typology of 50 retail chains 
and their more than 70,000 domestic store locations. Using a two-step cluster analysis, 
twelve distinct location types emerged, capturing both site and trade area characteristics. 
For each chain, a location profile included its proportion of each location type. A 
hierarchical cluster analysis grouped together the chains with the most similar location 
profiles. In general, competitors and retailers with value platform similarities selected 
similar locations. For instance, most specialty retailers tended to locate more often in 
large markets with many choosing to be near other major retailers. Smaller stores such as 
auto supply and discount stores had a considerable presence in smaller markets. We 
identified three general types of market choice by retailers including deployment in all 
market sizes, only large markets, and only in large retail areas. Given the size of store and 
category of retailer, we found that specialty stores with their higher order goods and 
deeper product lines favored larger market or shopping area locations while the largest 
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mass merchandisers and smallest discount stores with lower order goods often deployed 
in smaller markets. Mass merchandisers, like Walmart, are often found in smaller 
markets because of the large threshold of distance that consumers are willing to drive for 
the one-stop shopping experience. Finally, we found urbanization to be associated with 
the diversity index (Gini coefficient) of the location profiles of the chains. Retailers that 
favored urban deployment have had the opportunity to locate in more diverse situations 
within metropolitan areas. Retailers that do not limit themselves to deployment in the 
largest retail areas had even more diverse location profiles. Retailers that deploy in small 
markets with high frequency have less diversity because they can choose to be in the best 
or only retail area in the market. Further, since small markets outnumber large markets, 
these retailers can identify thousands of markets for deployment in similar situations.  
The results provide a glimpse into the deployment behaviors of different types of 
retail chains, relating the choice of locations to the value platform. As the retail 
marketplace is constantly evolving, some chains may have to depart from their traditional 
deployment patterns to continue to grow. Given the maturity of a chain, the opportunities 
for choosing locations in familiar or desired settings may diminish. For example, we 
discussed how Walmart has begun venturing into uncharted territory with its urban 
deployment. The results show that it has considerable room for growth in location types 
such as (9) Metro Neighborhood, (12) Dense Urban Areas and perhaps in some of the 
larger retail areas. For a chain that has been accustomed to opening the largest of the big-
box stores, learning how to operate smaller stores in urban areas can be challenging. 
Walmart has introduced their Neighborhood Market concept as well as reducing the size 
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of the supercenter to fit some locations (Graph 2006). As a number of older malls 
continue to struggle and lose tenants, a chain like Walmart may be able to embark on a 
strategy of opening new standard stores or supercenters in these spaces. There is some 
evidence of this as Ceh and Hernandez (2010) found a successful venture between a new 
Walmart and an older mall property in Toronto. In order to be successful in new location 
types, however, chains must carefully consider whether the current value platform will 
best serve the needs of its potential customers. Walmart’s increased focus on groceries, 
however, contributes to its attractiveness in a variety of settings, especially as many 
urban cores have become “food deserts” (D'Innocenzio and Beck 2011). 
A departing theme to this article is that retailers with diverse location profiles may be 
able to increase the productivity of individual stores if they are flexible with their value 
platforms. The clustering also demonstrated that not every location is entirely unique. In 
other words, there may not be a need to consider every store individually but instead, 
planning for similar types of stores may be more appropriate. The supermarket chain 
Vons found income, age, ethnicity, seasonality, and competitors to be the most influential 
factors differentiating the stores in the chain and identified five distinct store types using 
cluster analysis and opened up two other store types with distinct value platforms and 
achieved positive results (Johnson 1997). In fact, customizing the stores to meet the 
needs of the trade area can provide a distinctive competitive advantage (Grewal et al. 
1999).  
These data will allow for numerous opportunities for extension of this research. 
Competitors can be researched further on their geographic differentiation including a 
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study of the types of locations in which competitors tend to agglomerate most often. 
Particular retailers can be tracked over time for how their location profiles change as it 
can be part of a larger study of real estate maturity and the impacts on business practices. 
Follow-up studies could test the results to a survey of prices or shoppers. Finally, the 
retailers may be surveyed or investigated for value platform modifications based on retail 
type. The literature needs continual study of retail location patterns as this industry 
changes quickly. Simply conducting the exact same study on a regular basis can provide 
insight as to where the United States is heading with its retailing practices. 
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4. Modeling Retail Chain Expansion and Maturity through Wave Analysis: Theory 
and Application to Walmart and Target 
4.1 Introduction 
The spatial expansion of retail chains is heavily motivated by the desire to increase sales. 
Given that many of these companies are publicly traded, this motivation is exacerbated 
by pressures from the stock market. Companies like Walmart have experienced their 
highest price-to-earnings (P/E) multiples during eras of high new store deployment 
(Serpkenci and Tigert 2006). While undoubtedly, individual business practices among 
retailers lead to variations in the store deployment process, all retailers must consider the 
locations of their existing stores before deciding upon new store locations. For example, 
saturating the region where the retailer opened its first store reduces the opportunity for 
growth in that region and thus, future deployment may have to occur in more distant 
regions. After expanding to the other regions, the retailer may need to revisit the original 
saturated region after a period of time to continuing growing its store count. On the other 
hand, if a retailer spread its initial growth over a larger area, then conceivably it could fill 
in the gaps within the areas where it already has stores. 
This article analyzes retail store contagion, or the growth and diffusion of chains over 
time and space. The objective is to analyze whether the process of new store deployment 
is the result of a series of systematic series of stages. If so, does it resemble waves? Cliff 
and Haggett (2006) examined a similar problem in the epidemiological literature, but this 
concept has not yet been applied to retail. Other metrics to track the continuity of 
deployment over space are also presented. 
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Following the approach of Cliff and Haggett (2006), this article investigates the 
degree to which waves of store deployment represent a systematic pattern, with periods 
of swash and backwash. Using the analogy from coastal geomorphology, the initial swash 
stage involves the introduction of a retailer to a new region through multi-store 
deployment. Areas closer to the location of the first store of the retailer may be more 
likely to experience this stage sooner. The retailer shifts to a different region for new 
store deployment once the closer areas reach saturation. This may be the next closest 
area, especially for chains that place a high priority on maintaining low distribution costs. 
The closest area to the first store would experience a backwash stage of fewer store 
openings. As the retailer eventually expands to all areas, it becomes incumbent to revisit 
markets for deployment if it wants to keep growing. Consider that the older stores in the 
area close to the first store of the chain may be some of the most profitable stores because 
of less expensive real estate costs as well as stronger brand awareness due to the length of 
time of being deployed in that area. In this case, the retailer accepts the cannibalization of 
these high performing stores in an effort to secure new sites for store deployment. This 
represents a re-swash stage for a chain reaching domestic real-estate maturity. This is 
when most new growth requires significant cannibalization of existing stores (Joseph 
2010). 
This study focuses on the growth of Target and Walmart. Although similar in many 
respects, Walmart and Target have been studied for what differentiates them, including 
their differences in growth patterns, locations, trade areas, customers, and overall value 
platforms (Graff 2006; Shields and Kures 2007; Joseph 2009, Joseph 2010). The analysis 
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seeks to identify whether there are systematic processes to their deployment, in the form 
of swash-backwash waves. This modeling is related to the real-estate maturity of chains, 
in the sense of saturation of markets. This maturity may affect the locations of new store 
deployment and could also be linked to alterations in business practices.  
 
4.2 Relevant Literature on Retail Expansion 
The processes behind retail expansion have been analyzed using a myriad of methods.  
Distances from company headquarters have been proven to affect the location of new 
stores (Brown 1981; Jones 1981; Manuszak and Moul 2008; Zhu and Singh 2009). 
Joseph (2010) found that distance from the first store was a factor that helped explain the 
locations of Walmart stores until it reached the stage of domestic real-estate maturity. 
The locations of Target stores, however, were not affected by the distance to its first 
store. The locations of distribution centers also play a key role in explaining deployment 
of retail chains, and can even constrain new locations to a certain area (Laulajainen 1987; 
1988; Shields and Kures 2007; Holmes 2011). In fact, the benefit of regional saturation 
may be realized with improved economies of scale including more efficient distribution 
costs (Graff 1998). Walmart has kept its distribution costs low by opening up new stores 
close to its existing stores, (Jia 2008; Holmes 2011). Some retailers may choose to stay 
regional and diffuse slowly across space because there are advantages to customer 
familiarity with the brand (Laulajainen 1988). Retailers that opened their first store in 
smaller markets may seek to deploy in other small markets and vice versa for retailers 
that opened their first store in large markets (Jones and Simmons 1987; Laulajainen 
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1987). To that end, Walmart, which opened its first store in the small town of Rogers, 
Arkansas, had much of its early growth in small towns (Graff 1998). Target, on the other 
hand, has historically opened more stores in larger markets (Graff 2006). Its first store 
was in the Minneapolis suburb of Roseville, Minnesota. Another option for growth 
includes acquiring stores from other retailers (Laulajainen 1987). Target had considerable 
store growth over its first few decades from acquisitions (Joseph 2010). 
There are many studies on Walmart, the largest retailer in the world with sales 
exceeding those of the next five largest US retailers combined (Basker 2007). The 
success of Walmart has been attributed to technological investment and capitalizing on 
economies of scale (Basker 2007; Holmes 2011). Walmart maintained a contiguous store 
network as it diffused from its first location (Holmes 2011). Although it suffered early 
cannibalization of its younger stores, it more than made up the difference due to cost 
savings with its supply chain, which enabled it to offer everyday low prices (Graff 2006; 
Basker 2007). These low prices have changed the retail landscape, affecting competitors 
and contributing to store closures (Graff 2006). 
Retailers generally attempt to remain consistent with the formula that made them 
successful. Change occurs out of necessity or at times desperation. For example, senior 
leadership at Walmart announced in 2007 that the retailer would much rather be building 
larger supercenters (McWilliams 2007). Walmart, however, has become strained by its 
real-estate maturity. Its high store count means that there are few markets left in the US 
where it can substantially increase its market share (Serpkenci and Tigert 2006). In a 
response to grow sales, Walmart has deviated from its core identity by enacting some 
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price increases for some of its merchandise. Target, the upscale discounter, was found to 
offer several items for lower prices than Walmart (Joseph 2009). Recent press also 
substantiated the higher prices at Walmart, although it has begun to roll back some of 
these increases and still matches any lower advertised price (D’Innocenzio and Beck 
2011). Perhaps its real-estate maturity is most evident as it has begun to deploy 
aggressively in non-traditional places such as dense urban areas (Ceh and Hernandez 
2010) and has introduced a variety of store formats to meet the needs of the new location 
types (Bonanno 2010). 
 
4.3 Data and Methods 
4.3.1 Conceptual Introduction and Adaptation of the Cliff and Haggett Model 
The objectives of this article are two-fold. First, this article introduces a method from 
medical geography used to study epidemiological waves and adapts it to the study of the 
diffusion patterns of retail stores over time and space. Second, it applies these modified 
methods to study the spread of Walmart and Target. In particular, these methods will help 
us understand whether subareas within a larger study area experience deployment in a 
wave-like manner, with periods of higher or slower growth varying between the subareas 
at different times. The modeling and analysis contributes to the retail literature by better 
understanding the systematic processes of retail expansion using unique methods for this 
field of study. 
Cliff and Haggett (2006) presented a number of different metrics and statistics to 
characterize the spatio-temporal advance and retreat of disease cases as part of a single 
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wave. They introduced a space-time matrix in which the cells represent the number of 
cases notified in a given subarea i in a given time period t. The counterpart in retail is the 
advance of new stores of a retail chain through space and time, with each cell of the 
matrix providing the number of new stores in subarea i in time t. Cliff and Haggett 
introduced the concept of the leading edge LEi, representing “the start of the epidemic 
wave in the different subareas” (p. 231). The retail equivalent is the first cell for each 
subarea (the first cell in each row) with a positive entry for number of new stores. 
Cliff and Haggett (2006) assumed that the study area was subdivided into subareas 
such as counties, districts, provinces, or census tracts, numbered in no particular spatial 
order. After creating the matrix and identifying the leading edge for each subarea, they 
rearrange the rows of the matrix with the subareas from the earliest to latest leading edge, 
so that the leading edge progresses in steps upwards and to the right through the matrix. 
In adapting this model to retail, we propose using distance-based concentric rings 
originating from the first store location of each chain instead of pre-defined districts. 
Doing so explicitly tracks whether a retailer expands outward in concentric rings from its 
first store location; it also avoids the step of rearranging the rows of the matrix. 
In Cliff and Haggett’s model, the area of the matrix to the left of the leading edge—
that is, the space-time cells with no cases yet—is called the Susceptible area. The retail 
equivalent would be the Prospective area into which the chain has not yet expanded. To 
the right of the leading edge is the area of the matrix that Cliff and Haggett term the 
Infected area, which in retail terms would be the Deploying area. 
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At this point, our retail adaptation departs from the Cliff and Haggett method. For 
epidemiological purposes, Cliff and Haggett defined a following edge, representing the 
time period for each subarea after which no new cases are reported. (It is possible that a 
cell in the Infected area could have a value of 0, but it would not be the following edge 
unless all cells to the right also have a value of 0.) They re-sort the rows a second time 
from earliest to latest following edge, and define the area of the matrix to the right of the 
following edge as the Recovered area, which consists of all zeroes and proceeds in steps 
up and to the right. 
In their article, if new cases arise in the same subarea in later time periods after an 
extended period of zeroes, they treat it as a new single-wave outbreak. This treatment, 
however, does not translate well to retail because new store openings tend not to drop to 
zero in a subarea for any extended period of time due to store closings and replacements, 
population growth, suburban expansion, urban revitalization, etc. Therefore, rather than 
identify a following edge defined by a permanent end of store openings, we define a 
Saturated stage when new stores in the subarea stop increasing over time and begin 
decreasing. 
One important difference introduced here is that retailers may revisit areas for 
expansion in a second wave once growth has waned in an area. When new stores in a 
subarea stop decreasing and begin a second increasing stage, we define a fourth phase 
which we call Revisiting, or Re-Swash. There is no equivalent to this stage in the Cliff 
and Haggett model, although it could be related to the start of a new epidemic, which 
they treat as a new independent single wave. Whereas in medical geography the next 
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epidemic is seen as a mostly independent new episode, in retail geography we see it as a 
natural follow-up stage driven by the stock market’s expectation of continued store 
growth. 
 
Table 4.1. Equivalency between Epidemiological and Retail Interpretations of the Status 
of Subarea i in Time t 
 
Coastal Geomorphology Epidemiological  
(Cliff and Haggett 2006) 
Retail  
(Proposed here) 
 Susceptible (S) 
No cases yet 
Prospective 
No stores yet 
Swash 
Wave moving up beach 
Infected (I) 
Cases reported 
Deploying 
New store growth 
Backwash 
Wave moving back to sea 
Recovered (R) 
No more new cases 
Saturation 
Fewer new stores than previous period 
  Revisiting (Re-swash) 
More new stores than previous period 
 
 
Finally, the Cliff and Haggett method produces a single swash-backwash wave for all 
subareas combined. They construct the curve from the net spatial change, defined as the 
number of leading edge cells minus the number of following edge cells, graphed by time 
period. This produces a swash-backwash curve for the entire region. If more subareas are 
getting their first cases of the disease than are resolving their last cases, the region as a 
whole is in swash phase; if the opposite occurs it is in backwash phase. While this could 
be applied to retail, our goal is not to characterize a chain as a whole as being in 
expansion or saturation stage. Rather, our goal is to characterize the phase that different 
rings are in at different times, so that the (re-)swash phase in some rings can be related to 
the backwash stage of others. Part of our reason for using rings rather than districts, 
therefore, is to be able to apply the swash-backwash method to assess whether retail 
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chains follow a distance-based pattern of expanding in an area, followed by slowing in 
that area while expanding in the next area, and so on until it runs out of room for virgin 
expansion, after which it begins to revisit some of the previous areas in a systematic way. 
Therefore, to adapt Cliff and Haggett’s swash-backwash curve to separate rings, we 
calculate and graph the net change in new store count in each ring rather than the net 
change in the overall district count making a phase transition at the leading or following 
edges. 
 
4.3.2 Modeling the Expansion of Target and Walmart 
The data include the locations of all standard and supercenter Target and Walmart store 
openings between 1962 and 2009 in the contiguous lower 48 US states. While our main 
objective is methodological rather than comparative, applying the new method to both 
retailers will show its utility for characterizing and contrasting their deployment behavior. 
Target and Walmart, the two largest discount department store chains, are publicly traded 
companies and carry many of the same lines of merchandise. What’s more, these retailers 
both opened their first stores in 1962, a convenient factor for this type of longitudinal 
study as it controls for exogenous phenomena such as recessions.  
As seen in the literature review, Target and Walmart have employed dissimilar 
strategies towards the store deployment process. Whereas Target’s growth was initially 
related to real estate opportunities and acquisitions in desirable locations, Walmart has 
systematically diffused across space from its first store location. In light of these 
differences, the following research question is addressed: Is retail deployment at 
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particular distances from the chain’s origin subject to cyclical alterations between periods 
of increasing and decreasing growth? Despite their differences, it was hypothesized that 
some type of distance-related wave-like pattern will exist to some extent for both chains. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. 200-km rings from Target’s (a) and Walmart’s (b) first stores 
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The first step is to present descriptive statistics to analyze the spatio-temporal 
deployment of Target and Walmart stores. This includes creating a space-time matrix of 
store openings for each chain, as well as providing summary tables and graphs based on 
the data in each matrix. Each subarea ( ia ) represents a 200-kilometer ring around the first 
store location of each chain, with a total number of subareas (A). Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
locations of the first stores of Walmart (Rogers, Arkansas) and Target (Roseville, 
Minnesota). The overall duration of the study period (T) is broken down into five-year 
intervals (t). A cell ( itq ) in the AxT matrix represents the overall number of new stores 
that opened in ring i during time period t. For example, 37q  for Target includes all new 
stores located 400-599 kilometers away from Roseville (ring 3) during 1990-1994 (time 
period 7).  
Building upon the work of Cliff and Haggett (2006), we introduce a new metric s , 
the average number of skipped rings across all time periods, to track the spatial 
discontinuity of deployment. First, we define a corresponding binary matrix in which a 1 
indicates at least one new store was opened in ring i in time t, and 0 otherwise. Thus, mit 
=1 if qit >0 and 0 if qit =0. Given that, s , the average number of skipped rings per time 
period, is defined as follows: 
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For each time period, (1) computes the difference between the ring number of the farthest 
ring experiencing deployment 0) >  |  ( iti qiMax  and the total number of individual rings, 


A
i
itm
1
, experiencing deployment in time t. This difference tells us how many rings were 
skipped in time t. s  sums up this difference over all time periods and divides it by the 
number of time periods T to obtain the average number of skipped rings per time period. 
s  indicates whether a chain diffused in a continuous manner over space or if it skipped 
past areas to open new stores. A value of 0 represents continuous deployment in every 
time period while larger values signify more sporadic growth.  
We hypothesize that the time period in which a store was first located in a given ring 
is associated with the distance of that ring from the location of the first store of the chain. 
Following Cliff and Haggett (2006), we calculate the average time period across all rings 
that the leading edge (    ) arrives. Define fit = 1 if time t is the leading edge cell for ring 
i. In (2), the number of rings with new store growth for the first time (

A
i
itf
1
) is 
multiplied by the time period in which it is occurring, summed over all time periods, and 
divided by the number of rings.      is useful for comparing how quickly different retail 
chains spread their new store growth to new rings.  
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The next step is to calculate areal phase transition within the matrix, which designates 
subareas into stages for a particular time interval based on the number of store openings 
relative to the previous interval of time. We designate a “Prospective” phase for subareas 
(rings) that have not yet had a new store opening, followed by “Deploying” and 
“Saturation” phases. The Deploying phase occurs when a subarea receives its first store 
opening, and continues for each subsequent t for as long as the number of new store 
openings exceeds that of the previous period. Once growth begins to slow, with fewer 
store openings than occurred during the previous period, that subarea is deemed 
Saturated. We also recognize a fourth stage that we call “Revisiting.” This occurs when 
the amount of new growth then re-exceeds that of a Saturation stage. Any decreases and 
increases in new stores beyond that are then considered as additional Saturation and 
Revisiting stages.  
To implement this classification of matrix cells into stages, we track whether a 
subarea is in the stage of more, fewer, or relatively the same number of new stores 
openings in a period relative to the previous period. Specifically, equation (3) defines the 
change between phases. This method essentially controls for the different potential for 
growth in different areas, because it only compares the store openings in a given ring to 
openings in the same ring in the previous t. 
 
)1(  tiitit qqq
      
(3) 
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A systematic process of deployment may bear a resemblance to a wave over time for 
an area, with stages of swash and backwash. Plotting (3) for each ring illustrates whether 
the hypothesized swash-backwash-re-swash, (i.e. deploying-saturating-revisiting) wave 
behavior is in effect. Subareas that have positive delta values on the vertical axis are 
considered in a stage of swash while anything negative is considered backwash. Figure 
4.2 shows the idealized plot with swash, backwash, and re-swash, and how they 
correspond to the four phases of Prospective, Deploying, Saturation, and Revisiting. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Idealized plot of a swash-backwash wave for a single ring. This curve could 
exemplify the second ring from the original store location if all new stores in the first two 
time periods were concentrated in the first ring only. 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Deployment Patterns of Walmart and Target 
Figure 4.3 presents space-time matrices of new store openings for Walmart (A) and 
Target (B) respectively. Due to the locations of their first stores, Walmart has a 14x10 
matrix: 14 rings of 200 km each, and 10 time periods of 5 years each beginning in 1960. 
Target’s matrix is 13x10 because of the more central location of its first store. The shaded 
cells represent pairs of rings and time periods that have yet to receive a new store.  
 
 
 
A Walmart 
 
1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 
 
km 
a14 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 13 5 4 2600-2799 
a13 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 16 12 3 2400-2599 
a12 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 12 17 25 2200-2399 
a11 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 54 48 48 2000-2199 
a10 0 0 0 0 0 0 32 31 43 61 1800-1999 
a9 0 0 0 0 0 13 87 54 69 33 1600-1799 
a8 0 0 0 0 18 58 88 41 59 40 1400-1599 
a7 0 0 0 0 23 72 71 46 52 23 1200-1399 
a6 0 0 0 0 33 97 100 48 64 52 1000-1199 
a5 0 0 0 0 90 140 132 38 82 4 800-999 
a4 0 0 0 14 143 146 49 18 47 6 600-799 
a3 0 1 11 74 85 61 29 8 35 13 400-599 
a2 0 4 40 59 45 33 6 7 15 13 200-399 
a1 2 8 30 15 16 9 2 2 3 2 0-199 
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10  
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B Target 
 
1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2009 
 
km 
a13 0 0 0 0 16 49 19 30 47 46 2400-2599 
a12 0 0 0 0 2 27 17 13 26 33 2200-2399 
a11 0 0 0 0 2 8 34 18 29 33 2000-2199 
a10 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 5 16 16 1800-1999 
a9 0 0 1 1 4 1 11 56 103 68 1600-1799 
a8 0 0 0 0 3 6 4 91 75 86 1400-1599 
a7 0 2 0 2 4 3 3 16 36 34 1200-1399 
a6 0 1 4 3 8 4 7 32 28 46 1000-1199 
a5 0 0 0 0 6 11 19 21 31 17 800-999 
a4 0 1 1 1 3 10 13 15 26 20 600-799 
a3 0 0 2 2 3 1 34 20 29 23 400-599 
a2 1 0 0 3 1 2 13 5 9 2 200-399 
a1 1 1 0 2 2 4 16 10 17 17 0-199 
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10  
 
Figure 4.3. Space-Time Deployment Matrix for (A) Walmart and (B) Target 
 
Overall deployment is temporally continuous, in that all time periods have some level 
of new store growth. Both retailers have opened stores in all distance rings from their first 
store location, providing general areal continuity. Where they differ, however, is that 
Walmart has never skipped a ring to open a new store in a ring farther away. On the other 
hand, Target opened up new stores in rings up to 1,400 kilometers away from its first 
store location as early as the second time interval, which corresponds to the late 1960s, 
without filling in all the rings in between. Target had discontinuous spatial growth until 
the late 1980s. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the deployment over the time intervals, based on the matrices 
in Figure 4.3. Unlike Target, Walmart did not deploy stores in regions far away from its 
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first store during its few decades of existence. It did, however, grow its store count much 
faster than Target. By the end of fifth time period (1980-1984), Walmart’s store count 
outnumbered that of Target by nearly 9-to-1. Spatially, Target had already expanded to 
all distance rings except one while Walmart had just finished its continuous expansion to 
the 1,400-1,600 kilometer subarea. It was not until the early 1990s that both retailers 
opened up stores in every single distance band, and continued to for the remaining four 
time periods. 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of Walmart and Target Store Openings in Studied Area 
A Walmart             1962            2009 
t 1t  2t  3t  4t  5t  6t  7t  8t  9t  10t  
New Stores (∑q) 2 13 81 162 453 629 742 388 551 327 
Store Count 2 15 96 258 711 1340 2082 2470 3021 3348 


A
i
itm
1
 
1 3 3 4 8 9 14 14 14 14 
0 >  |  iti qiMax  1 3 3 4 8 9 14 14 14 14 
           
B Target                 1962            2009 
t 1t  2t  3t  4t  5t  6t  7t  8t  9t  10t  
New Stores (∑q) 2 5 8 14 54 127 203 332 472 441 
Store Count  2 7 15 29 83 210 413 745 1217 1658 


A
i
itm
1
 
2 4 4 7 12 13 13 13 13 13 
0 >  |  iti qiMax  2 7 9 9 13 13 13 13 13 13 
 
 
Equation 1 measures the level of spatial continuity. The value of s  for Walmart is 0, 
which represents complete spatial continuity. This metric indicates that Walmart never 
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skipped a ring. Walmart did, however, expand its national presence substantially in t5-t7 
(1980-1994), increasing it store count 8-fold from 258 to 2,082 and the number of 
distance rings from 4 to 14. Target had a s  of 1.1, meaning it skipped over an average of 
1.1 rings per t. For instance, Target expanded out to Ring 7 (1200-1399 km) in t2 (1965-
69) without first filling in Rings 2, 3, and 5, while in t3  it skipped over Rings 1, 2, 5, 7, 
and 8. All in all, Target skipped 11 rings over 10 time periods, although by t6 (1985-89) it 
had at least one store in every ring.  
Breaking down Target’s deployment patterns further, most of its stores are less than 
20 years old. Still, it located stores far beyond Minnesota early in its history. Unlike 
Walmart, it did not initially saturate its home base. Instead, its first sizable deployment 
phase occurred during the late 1980s ( 6t ) in the most-distant areas—on the east and west 
coasts. During the early 1990s ( 7t ), Target did not avoid any regions and ramped up its 
growth considerably by nearly doubling its store count (from 210 to 413). Target has 
dramatically increased its deployment since the late 1990s, especially at the medium 
distances from its first store. In 2000-2004 ( 9t ), it opened more stores than it did in the 
previous period in all but two rings. 
Comparing the two chains in terms of new store openings and cumulative store count 
over distance and time, Figure 4.4 illustrates a much more systematic pattern for Walmart 
than Target. The cumulative curves show that Walmart still has a greater regional focus 
of its stores near its first location than Target. Target has several different bands where it 
peaks, with its highest peaks representing saturation in many urban markets in the 
Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, and California. Consider that even though Walmart has nearly 
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twice the domestic store count as Target, Target outnumbers Walmart in California 
(Joseph 2010). Figure 4.4B also illustrates how much of Target’s deployment at all 
distances is concentrated in the more recent years. Another observation from the figure is 
that the retailers revisit areas for deployment at a later point in time after slowing growth 
in an area (re-swash—see arrows). This phase is especially evident for Walmart, which 
began its mass deployment at earlier time. Another observation for Walmart is that when 
it revisits an area, it only opens up about half of the number of stores as it did during the 
initial deployment phase. This represents its saturation within these markets and the 
limits on how many new stores can be opened without excessive cannibalization of 
existing stores. These behaviors are discussed in the next section. 
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Figure 4.4. Space-Time Deployment of Walmart and Target. Arrows point to revisited 
areas (Re-swash/Revisiting phase). 
 
4.4.2 Phase Transitions 
Equation 3 tracks the difference in store count in a ring between a time period and the 
immediate previous period. Figure 4.5 classifies the subareas within the following 
stages—Prospective, Deploying, Saturation, and Revisiting. 
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Figure 4.5. Phase Transitions of Deployment 
 
The darker shading in the figure represents areas that were prospective during the 
time periods shown. Table 4.3 quantifies the differences between the Walmart and Target 
diagrams in Figure 4.5. Whereas two-fifths of Walmart cells are prospective, the number 
is less than one quarter for Target. The implication of this is that within the overall 
studied area, more subareas were exposed to Target stores at an earlier time. Figure 4.5 
also shows the leading edge (LE) of deployment. Using (2), the value of LEt  is 5.00 for 
Walmart and 3.46 for Target, which means that on average, a ring received its first 
Walmart store during the 5
th
 time period while a ring received its first Target store 
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between the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 time periods. This mathematically confirms Target’s exposure to 
more distance bands at an earlier time than Walmart. Couple this with the fact that 
Walmart had a much higher store count and the result was that Walmart was a budding 
regional power while Target was introducing itself in selected markets but without high 
market share. Only recently has Walmart revisited markets for deployment, which 
explains its lower revisiting value compared to Target (Table 4.3). Target has been 
revisiting markets for years. Another way to analyze this is that Walmart systematically 
targeted a market, saturated it up to the market threshold, and then allowed it time to 
mature prior to deploying more stores in that area. Thus, it only revisited a market once it 
ran out of space to grow within the studied area. 
 
Table 4.3. Share of Phase Transitions of Deployment 
 Prospective Deploying Saturation Revisiting 
Walmart 40.0% 22.1% 25.7% 12.1% 
Target 24.6% 27.7% 21.5% 26.2% 
 
 
The revisiting (cannibalization) phase is not intended to suggest that all individual 
stores were being cannibalized. It does suggest, however, that cannibalization was likely 
occurring. This follows the assumption that for a growing retailer, there would have been 
new store deployment within the region at an earlier time if the threshold could have 
supported additional stores as opposed to seeking growth in farther away regions. 
Consider the advantages to locating within the same market for reasons such as 
distribution, marketing, and more. In the revisiting phase, markets once deemed saturated 
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are revisited for growth. To be fair, once younger stores have matured, companies may be 
able to withstand the cannibalization once they know the markets better. In addition, the 
cannibalized stores may be mainly losing customers for whom that store was not very 
conveniently located in the first place. Or, as in the case of Home Depot, retailers may be 
strategically attempting to capture or protect market share or preempt location of a 
competitor (Lowe’s)—that is, it may be a strategy of cannibalizing one’s own store rather 
than losing those same customers to a competitor’s store (Hernandez, 2003). As different 
companies have different goals and objectives, the strategy side to growth may take 
different forms. 
 
4.4.3 Store Deployment as a Swash-Backwash Pattern 
The final step is to analyze Walmart and Target in terms of waves with alternating 
periods of swash and backwash for various distances from the first store locations. 
Distance rings are aggregated into 400 kilometer intervals (double rings) so that the 
patterns are more visible to the reader (14 waves makes the diagram too cluttered). 
Growth prior to 1970 is combined into a single value as the chains had only four stores 
combined prior to 1965. Using (3) to calculate the difference in new store growth in 
subarea i in time t versus the period previous ( itq ), Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the 
results for Walmart and Target. The lines are smoothed to further illustrate the wave-like 
motion, although they intersect the actual data points for each time interval. 
The deployment of Walmart stores over space clearly exhibits a swash-backwash-re-
swash pattern over time. The wave analysis reveals that Walmart systematically moved 
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from region to region, starting from its home region until it reached the maximum extent 
of the studied area in the early 1990s. Prior to 1980, Walmart was a regional retailer, 
focusing its deployment within 800 kilometers of Rogers. During the 1980s, Walmart 
continued to open new stores in its home region but fewer than in the previous period. In 
the closest ring, 0-399 kilometers, Walmart had three consecutive periods of swash until 
1980 and four consecutive periods of swash in the second closest ring, 400-799 
kilometers, until 1985. The innermost ring then experienced three consecutive periods of 
backwash (saturation) while the second ring also experienced three consecutive periods 
of backwash, starting ten years later. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Swash, Backwash, and Re-swash Waves for Walmart 
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Walmart experienced its highest peaks of swash in the 400-799 and 800-1,199 
kilometer ranges from its first store during the 1980s. This combination of space and time 
represented the most intense deployment in Walmart’s history. Store count growth in 
800-1,199 km range waned in the 1990s though. Walmart saturated the markets in the 
400-799 and the 800-1,199 kilometer ranges to such a great extent during the 1980s that 
it could find fewer than half the number of locations to open new stores in the 1990s. In 
addition, during the late 1980s, Walmart grew by a considerable amount in the 1,200-
1,599 kilometer range. This range would have three consecutive periods of swash 
following the initial deployment. 
Walmart has only been a nationally deployed retailer for less than two decades. By 
the start of 1990, Walmart only had 13 stores more than 1,600 kilometers away from 
Rogers and no stores beyond 1,800 kilometers in the lower 48 US states. In the 1990s, 
however, Walmart completed its expansion to all parts of lower 48. The 1,600-1,999 
kilometer range had its initial swash in the late 1980s followed by a greater period of 
swash in the early 1990s before reaching a period of backwash in the late 1990s. The 
2,000-2,399 kilometer range had high swash during its initial deploying phase in the early 
1990s, followed immediately by backwash in the late 1990s. The farthest ring, over 2,400 
kilometers from Rogers, had its initial swash phase in the early 1990s followed by three 
consecutive periods of backwash. Walmart avoided deployment in its home region during 
the 1990s, although they did convert some existing stores to supercenters during that time 
(Graff, 2006). 
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After 2000, Walmart began to reach a point of domestic real estate maturity.  
Evidence for this statement is that it stabilized its number of store openings at various 
distances as it revisited markets for growth and the opportunities began to wane in the 
farthest rings. New store growth in the markets that experienced a re-swash stage in the 
early 2000s was likely to cannibalize existing stores. Walmart even began to search for 
new locations in some of the small towns within the mostly rural 0-399 kilometer range. 
Signs of the economic recession can be detected after 2005 as total growth slowed. 
Another factor affecting the results may be that Walmart began to focus on different store 
formats (e.g. Neighborhood Market) and international deployment. This type of alteration 
in strategy could be viewed as a byproduct of the dearth of adequate locations for 
standard and supercenter stores within the studied area. 
Target stores diffused in a much different manner than Walmart. Target grew more 
slowly than Walmart (Figure 4.7). Most of its stores are less than twenty years old. It 
significantly increased its store count in the 1990s and more than doubled its store count 
since 2000. Despite this slow growth, Target has had stores in locations far beyond 
Minnesota for a long time. Unlike Walmart, it did not initially saturate its home base. 
Instead, Target had more of an outside-in type of swash-backwash-re-swash, but still 
showed systematic behavior in its deployment. Its first sizable deployment phase during 
the 1980s occurred in the range that lies more than 2,400 kilometers from Roseville. 
More specifically, several stores opened in California, many as a result of acquisition. 
Demonstrating the wave-like pattern, this farthest subarea experienced backwash in the 
early 1990s followed by a ten-year period of re-swash. Target’s next peak of swash 
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occurred in the 2,000-2,399 kilometer subarea in the late 1980s with 35 store openings. It 
continued to grow during the early 1990s but at a slower rate. This subarea then 
experienced backwash in the late 1990s returning to two back-to-back periods of re-
swash.  
Target ramped up its growth in most rings in the early 1990s. The highest two peaks 
were for the 0-399 and 400-799 kilometer inner rings. Both of these bands would 
alternate between swash and backwash for the remaining periods. One subarea that did 
not experience swash in the early 1990s was the 1,200-1,599 kilometer range, which had 
slight backwash. This band’s highest swash, however, occurred in the late 1990s, with 
deployment in many of the urban markets in the Eastern US. Although this ring would 
experience slight backwash in the early 2000s, it still had considerable new store growth, 
just not an increase from the previous period. Target continued to find more opportunities 
for growth in the 1,600-1,999 kilometer range from 1990 through 2005. Growth in this 
range slowed considerably after 2005, perhaps due to the economic recession in addition 
to the fact that it had accumulated a high number of stores in this band. Most recently, 
Figure 4.7 illustrates that Target has entered something resembling a state of equilibrium 
in the sense that the deltas (change in new store opening from the previous period) have 
become quite small for all rings except for the aforementioned 1,600-1,999 kilometer 
ring. This is an indicator that Target reached real estate maturity in the early 2000s as 
every ring had finished experiencing its first swash and the chain began returning to fill 
in markets with more stores. Not surprising, Target has recently decided to seek growth 
in Canada in 2013 by acquiring the store leases of Zellers (Zimmerman and Talley 2011). 
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While it is pure conjecture to speculate about the future trend of swash or backwash for 
the different subareas, it is important to note that Target has also experienced alterations 
between swash and backwash. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Swash, Backwash, Re-swash Wave for Target 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
Walmart and Target, the two largest discount department store chains in the United 
States, which both opened their first store in 1962, have executed vastly dissimilar 
strategies for new store growth. In its infancy, Walmart grew methodically outward over 
space from its first store location in Arkansas. Target, on the other hand, sought growth in 
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a variety of markets, with some evidence of an opposite outside-in pattern with the first 
major wave of store growth in the 1980s at the farthest distances from Target’s first store 
in Minnesota before filling in the middle distance range. Despite the directional and 
distance differences between Walmart’s and Target’s expansion patterns, there are some 
strong commonalities between the two. Both of these growing retailers first expanded 
into an area, then reached a point of saturation in that area and opened fewer stores in it, 
moved on to focus on expansion in other areas, only to revisit the first areas at a later 
point in time. The spatio-temporal patterns of deployment of both companies were able to 
be modeled in the form of waves of swash and backwash with additional re-swash 
evident at later times in the rings that experienced early deployment. Although swash and 
backwash did not alternate perfectly for all time periods, and did not necessarily move 
from the first store outwards, there was a distinct general trend for an area to experience 
increasing swash leading to a peak and then increasing backwash, only to experience a 
second period of swash after other areas became saturated.  
In this article, we modified Cliff and Haggett’s wave analysis in a way that suggests a 
general model or theory for the domestic real estate maturity of chains. This general 
theory can be applied whatever a company’s strategy is, even if it is not a ripple from 
inside out or from one coast to another, and however the subareas are defined. In our 
case, subareas were treated as concentric rings extending from the first store of a chain. 
These subareas were placed into the following stages of retail expansion: Prospective, 
Deploying, Saturation, and Revisiting. The Prospective stage represents the time before 
the retailer expands to an area. The Deploying stage includes the time periods that a 
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retailer progressively increases its store count in that area. Saturation includes the time 
periods of decreasing store count growth in the area. While the first three have analogs in 
Cliff and Haggett’s work, the Revisiting stage is new. It represents when a retailer revisits 
an area once considered saturated for new store growth, indicative of real estate maturity.  
In addition to the wave analysis, we also introduced a new metric, s , to track the 
spatial continuity of deployment. It measures the level of sporadic growth, based on 
difference in ring numbers. We also modified Cliff and Haggett’s leading edge (LE) 
metric and applied it to the study of chain expansion. In our treatment, the leading edge 
measures the average number of time periods before a ring experienced new store 
growth, for all rings. Lower values represent faster deployment over space.  
What will happen next after the re-swash and revisiting stages are completed in most 
subareas remains to be seen. Without considerable population changes or evolution in the 
structure of retailing in the US, markets may not be able to withstand a third stage of 
swash. Although the results may be complicated by the recent economic recession, 
especially as it pertains to suburban housing growth, both chains have altered their 
behaviors after their second period of backwash. For instance, Walmart is developing 
formats for urban areas while Target has plans to open its first international stores (Ceh 
and Hernandez 2010; Zimmerman and Talley 2011).  
The next step is to broaden the study with additional retailers and retail types. Future 
studies would benefit by accounting for the number of store closures, relocations, or the 
changing in overall store square footage in the areas being studied as repositioning may 
surpass growing the count for mature retailers. The opportunity for advancement of this 
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research involves appending factors that can affect deployment, or are manifested by it. 
For example, the deployment of stores around distribution centers was noted in the 
literature, especially for Walmart. Thus, do the distribution centers open in areas prior to 
swash for Walmart? Also, at what point and in what locations do the chains experiment 
with different formats, or when and where do they deviate from the familiar demographic 
profile of the trade areas? Another important factor to consider will be the dates of 
acquisitions or international deployment. Finally, a promising line of research is to 
develop a method for swash-backwash-re-swash interactions between competitors. In 
particular, it could be worth exploring whether Target aimed its initial swash phase at the 
more sophisticated urban coastal markets that Walmart’s systematic swash had not yet 
reached, and developed its more upscale brand and store format to differentiate itself 
accordingly. 
Understanding the systematic process of chain store evolution and the associated 
strategies put forth by retailers provides foresight for the retailers to make better and 
preemptive decisions related to store and business development initiatives. Along those 
same lines, it is also valuable for competitors, developers, investors, communities, and 
other stakeholders to be better prepared for the impacts of retail expansion. 
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5. Conclusions 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This comprehensive mega-analysis contributes to the literature with one of the most 
thorough treatments of retail locational patterns and behaviors on record. It has relevancy 
to contemporary challenges facing retailers as they continue to find methods to grow 
despite their maturity. In addition to the company itself, including its employees, 
investors, leadership, and customers, retail organizations impact other retailers, 
consumers, communities, developers, and contribute to the overall health of the economy. 
In other words, since the decision to open one new store is part and parcel of a complex 
process of chain-store deployment, a wide variety of stakeholders are affected by 
individual decision making. Taking a static snapshot of a dynamic process, this 
dissertation can serve as a benchmark of the current US retail landscape. The analysis and 
discussion should appeal to both practitioners and theorists. The following discussions 
address some of the major findings in each article, followed by the common linkages 
between them, and the opportunities for advancing the research on this topic. 
In the first article, “Regionalism in US Retailing,” regional bias is found to be 
associated with store counts, small market deployment, and the location of the founding 
store, but not the age of the chain. Also, chains that started in smaller markets deploy 
more stores in other small markets and vice versa for chains that started in larger markets. 
The article has been published by Applied Geography in early 2013. 
In the second article, “The Location Types of US retailers,” a total of twelve distinct 
location types were identified using cluster analysis on situational and trade area data at 
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the geographical scale of the individual stores. Eight groupings of retailers with similar 
location profiles were identified in a second cluster analysis that grouped together the 
chains with the most similar location profiles. More often than not, retailers within the 
same retail business chose similar types of locations and thus were placed in the same 
clusters. Finally, further clustering into fewer groups revealed that retailers generally 
restrict their deployment to one of three overall strategies that were identified as 
metropolitan, large retail areas, or market size variety. While specialty retailers located in 
large retail areas of urban markets, smaller stores like discount stores, rental, auto supply 
and one-stop shop large mass merchandisers were commonly found in markets of all 
sizes, including non-metropolitan areas, indicating the continued importance of market 
thresholds and urban hierarchy. The article was submitted to Economic Geography in 
April 2012. A decision was rendered was to revise and resubmit. The primary 
improvements to the article included streamlining the analysis and discussion, as well as 
better motivating the article with additional theory. Follow revisions, the article as 
presented here was resubmitted in February 2013. At the time of writing this dissertation, 
no further decision has been made by the journal editors. 
In the final article, “Modeling Retail Chain Expansion and Maturity through Wave 
Analysis: Theory and Application to Walmart and Target,” we study retail store 
deployment through the analysis of waves, with alternating periods of faster or slower 
growth of chain expansion in an area. Using a space-time matrix of new store openings, 
we identify four stages: prospective, deploying, saturation, and revisiting. By analyzing 
the net change from one period to the next at increasing distances from a retailer’s 
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original store, the stages can be represented as swash, backwash, and re-swash waves. 
We found that Target and Walmart adopted dissimilar strategies, with Walmart diffusing 
gradually from Arkansas and Target growing from the coasts inward. They were similar, 
however, in that after expanding into an area they reached a point of saturation and 
opened fewer stores, then moved on to other areas, only to revisit the earlier areas for 
new stores. This article was submitted to the International Journal of Applied Geospatial 
Research in November 2012. We have received feedback from the editor to expect 
reviewer comments in April 2013.  
There are no specific areas of conflict between the articles. The articles support each 
other when they are viewed as a group. In fact, some gaps in one paper are filled by the 
findings in the others that help explain causal behaviors. For instance, in the first article, 
regionalism was found to be associated with whether a chain started in a small or large 
market. Chains that started in small markets chose other small market locations with 
greater frequency than chains that started in large markets. This finding also helps explain 
the diversity of the location profiles of the chains, which were discussed in the second 
article. In the third article on Walmart and Target, Walmart was noted for its methodical 
diffusion over time and space. Again going back to the first article on regionalism, 
Walmart started in a small market, which also seemed to influence its early strategy 
towards deployment as it could grow in other small markets nearby. Of course, this 
behavior cannot be viewed in isolation of other strategies by retailers such as Walmart’s 
desire to keep distribution costs low. It is interesting, however, to note the connection 
between such factors for many of the studied chains. 
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New theory emerged from each article, and when taken together, they establish a 
theoretical basis for why retailers choose to deploy in particular markets or sites, and the 
resultant effects on the spatial structure of the chain network. Value platforms and retail 
types are the primary factors in determining target customers. Depending on the amount 
and distribution of particular types of consumers, a market can support a certain number 
of stores. For example, modest income consumers outnumber affluent consumers. Along 
those lines, a chain with a value platform that targets modest income customers (e.g. 
Dollar General) has more potential sites to choose from, thus staving off real-estate 
maturity and allowing it to keep its regional focus despite its high store counts. Business 
practices and chain heritage influence the types of markets chosen. A retailer attempts to 
identify new locations that match the profile of some of its most successful existing 
locations. If the retailer is accustomed to having success in small towns, then it will 
continue to deploy in other small towns (e.g. Walmart). The hierarchy identified in this 
dissertation was not related to size of the store, but to the value platform. Category killers 
have deployed more in urban areas and the largest retail areas, while retailers that target 
price-conscious consumers were found to deploy in all markets.  
While the value platform affords retailers the opportunity for organic growth in a 
particular amount of locations, all retailers have a breaking point when they can no longer 
deploy new stores without encroaching upon the trade areas of existing stores. This stage 
of real-estate maturity has been experienced by some chains, and it leads to slowing 
growth or alterations in business practices. For example, Walmart has altered its value 
platform with a new retail concept in order to open stores in urban settings (i.e. 
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Neighborhood Market) as it exhausted most of its opportunities for growth in lower 
density areas. The stage of real-estate maturity is not associated with the age of the chain. 
Instead, it relates to store count deployment and value platform. 
 
5.2 Future Work 
This research has provided motivation for additional articles after the dissertation. One of 
the revisions to “The Location Types of US Retailers” was to remove a research question 
concerning clustering the chains by the lifestyle segmentation composition of their trade 
areas. This section has being targeted as its own article for submission to a special retail 
edition of The Professional Geographer. Another article deriving from this process seeks 
to explain how the 50 retailers are statistically associated or disassociated with each other 
in space, using the cross-K function. A short version of this treatment was published the 
2012 edition of Papers of the Applied Geography Conferences. It tested the spatial 
relationships between Target, Walmart and the other remaining chains in the Chicagoland 
area. 
The articles also have a common thread regarding the future potential for extension of 
the research. Overall, this research can be leveraged to not only understand behavior 
better, but to predict where and when stores will be built, and what retailers are going to 
build them. It provides a glimpse into possible changes to the future retailing 
marketplace. The first two articles could benefit by adding a temporal scale whereas the 
third article can benefit by studying more chains beyond Walmart and Target. There is 
also an opportunity to further analyze the theory behind store deployment decision-
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making along the lines of factors such as store formats and concepts, micro-
merchandising, international growth, and deployment in areas that deviate from 
traditional areas for particular chains. There is also the potential to expand to a scale 
beyond the US lower 48 contiguous states. For instance, possible research questions 
could include asking at what point in the maturity process do retailers first deploy 
internationally and to what extent. Another related question would be to survey how 
international value platforms compare to their domestic counterparts. A coverage model 
would provide how much of the population is within a certain distance of particular 
retailers, which could be related to real-estate maturity. 
 
5.3. Practical Application 
Retail is dynamic and the participants in this sector of the economy must be forward 
thinking concerning opportunities for growth. The discussions highlight practitioner 
strategies for practical implementation from value platform initiatives to market 
positioning among competitors. The managerial significance is that the results can help 
retailers make more informed decisions through increased cognizance of behavior 
patterns regarding store deployment. Retailers should have foresight concerning when 
they will reach real-estate maturity and be proactive with developing creative growth 
strategies accordingly, whether it be driven by brick and  mortar store deployment, omni-
channel retailing, international development, or alterations to the value platform to better 
serve local consumer demand. 
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There is greater need for the use of geographic methods by practitioners beyond the 
real-estate deployment process. For example, an untapped area of growth may be to 
improve productivity at existing stores instead of relying on constant growth to satisfy 
markets. While young expanding retailers are more concerned with finding real estate 
opportunities, mature chains, such as many of those in the dissertation, and saturated 
markets provide the impetus for differentiation and the challenge to cater to local demand 
(Johnson 1997). As early as the 1960s, Buzzell et al. (1965) discussed how growth and 
saturation impacted the profitability of grocery stores. When growth stops, retailers need 
to improve internally and geographic methods can be quite useful for increasing business 
efficiencies. By understanding the diversity of the location profiles and the levels of 
saturation, the suggested managerial implications in the articles may also provide 
foresight to predict changes in retail spatial patterns and the associated business practices 
for the next several years. 
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